Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE
DISTINCTIO IV.
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 95-96.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD
DISTINCTION 4
Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 95-96.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

Utrum Deus Pater se Deum genuerit.

Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria. Constat enim et irrefragabiliter verum est, quod Deus Pater genuit Filium. Ideo quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus genuit Deum. Si enim Deus genuit Deum, videtur quod aut se Deum, aut alium[1] genuerit. Si vero alium Deum genuit, non est tantum unus Deus; si autem se ipsum Deum genuit, aliqua res se ipsam genuit.

Ad quod respondentes dicimus, sane et[2] catholice concedi, quod unus unum genuit, et quod Deus Deum genuit, quia Deus Pater Deum Filium genuit. In Symbolo quoque scriptum est: « Lumen de Lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero ». Quod vero additur: ergo genuit se Deum vel alium Deum, neutrum concedendum esse dicimus. Quod alium Deum non genuit,[3] manifestum est, quia unus tantum Deus est. Quod autem se ipsum non genuit, ostendit Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate[4] dicens: « Qui putant eius potentiae esse Deum, ut se ipsum ipse genuerit, eo plus errant, quod non solum Deus ita non est, sed nec spiritualis neque corporalis creatura. Nulla enim res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit »; et ideo non est credendum vel dicendum, quod Deus genuit se.

Sed adhuc oppununt garruli ratiocinatores dicentes: si Deus Pater genuit Deum, aut

Chapter I

Whether God the Father begot Himself God.

Here there arises a sufficiently necessary question. For it is established and is irrefragably true, that God the Father begot the Son. For that reason it is asked, whether it must be conceded, that God begot God. For if God begot God, it seems that either He begot Himself God [se Deum], or an other.[1] However [vero] if He begot an other God, there is not only one God; moreover [autem] if He begot His very self God [se ipsum Deum], some thing begot its very self [se ipsam].

Responding to which, we say, that sanely and[2] in a catholic manner it is conceded, that One begot One, and that God begot God, because God the Father begot God the Son. In the Symbol it has also been written: « Light from Light, true God from true God ». However because there is added: therefore He begot Himself God and/or an other God, we say, that neither must be conceded. That He did not beget an other God,[3] is manifest, because there is only one God. Moreover that He did not beget His very self, (St.) Augustine shows in the first book On the Trinity[4] saying: « Those who think that (it belongs) to His power to be God, so that He Himself begot His very self, for this reason err the more, because not only is God not thus (in origin), but neither (is) a spiritual nor corporal creature. For there is no thing, which begets its very self, to be »; and for that reason it must not be believed or said, that God begot Himself.

But still do the garrulous reasoners oppose (this) saying: if God the Father begot God,

genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, aut Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Si genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater: ergo Deus est qui non est Deus Pater: non ergo unus tantum Deus est. Si vero genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater: ergo genuit se ipsum.

either He begot the God, who is God the Father, or a God, who is not God the Father. If he begot the God, who is not God the Father: therefore there is a God who is not God the Father: therefore there is not only one God. However if He begot the God, who is God the Father: therefore He begot His very self.

Ad quod respondemus determinantes istam[5] propositionem, quam sic proponunt: si Deus Pater genuit Deum, aut Deum, qui est Deus Pater, aut Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Hoc enim sane et prave intelligi potest; et ideo respondendum est ita: Deus Pater genuit Deum, qui est ipse Pater, hoc dicimus esse falsum; et concedimus alteram,[6] scilicet genuit Deum, qui non est Pater; nec tamen genuit alterum Deum, nec ille qui genitus est, alius Deus est quam Pater, sed unus Deus cum Patre. Si vero additur: genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, hic[7] distinguimus, quia dupliciter potest intelligi: genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, scilicet Deum Filium, qui Filius non est Pater, qui Deus est; hic sensus verus est. Si vero intelligatur sic: genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, id est, qui non est Deus, qui Pater est; hic sensus falsus est. Unus enim et idem Deus est Pater et[8] Filius et Spiritus sanctus; et e converso Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unus est Deus.

To which we respond, determining that[5] proposition of theirs, which they thus propose: 'if God the Father begot God, either the God, who is God the Father, or a God, who is not God the Father'. For this can be understood (both) sanely and in a depraved manner [prave]; and for that reason it must be responded to thus: 'God the Father begot the God, who is Himself the Father', this we say is false; and we concede the other (proposition),[6] that is that 'He begot a God, who is not the Father'; neither, however, did He beget an other God, nor is the One, who has been begotten, a God other than the Father, but (rather He is) one God with the Father. However [vero] if there is added: 'He begot a God, who is not God the Father,' here[7] we distinguish, because it can be understood in a twofold manner: 'He begot a God, who is not God the Father, that is God the Son, who (as) Son is not the Father, who is God'; here the sense is true. However if it is understood in this manner: 'He begot a God, who is not God the Father, that is, who is not the God, who is the Father'; this sense is false. For one and the same God is the Father and[8] the Son and the Holy Spirit; and conversely the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is the One God.

Cap. II.

Utrum Trinitas de uno Deo praedicetur, sicut unus Deus de tribus personis.

Chapter II

Whether the Trinity is predicated of the one God, as the one God (is) of the Three Persons.

Quidam tamen veritatis adversarii concedunt, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum sive tres personas esse unum Deum, unam substantiam, sed[9] nolunt concedere, unum Deum sive unam substantiam esse tres personas, dicentes, substantiam divinam praedicari de tribus personis, non tres personas de substantia divina. Fides autem catholica tenet ac praedicat, et tres personas esse unum Deum,[10] unam substantiam sive essentiam

However certain adversaries of the truth concede, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit or the Three Persons are one God, one Substance, but[9] do not want to concede, that the one God or one Substance is the Three Persons, saying, that the Divine Substance is predicated of the Three Persons, not the Three Persons of the Divine Substance. But the Catholic Faith holds and predicates, both that the Three Persons are the One God,[10] the one Substance or

sive naturam divinam, et unum Deum sive essentiam divinam esse tres pesonas. Unde Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate[11] ita ait: « Recte ipse Deus Trinitas intelligitur, beatus et solus potens ». Ecce, quam expresse dixit *ipse Deus Trinitas*, ut ostenderet, et ipsum Deum esse Trinitatem et Trinitatem ipsum Deum. Item in eodem: « In verbis, in quit, illis Apostoli, quibus de adventu Christi agens dicit:[12] *Quem ostendet beatus et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortalitatem* etc., nec Pater proprie nominatus est nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, sed beatus et solus potens, id est unus et solus Deus verus, qui est ipsa Trinitas ». Ecce et hic aperte dicit, unum solum verum Deum esse ipsam Trinitatem; et si unus Deus Trinitas est, ergo unus Deus est tres personae. Item in libro quinto de Trinitate:[13] « Non tres deos, sed unum Deum dicimus esse ipsam praestantissimam Trinitatem ». Item in libro, qui dicitur Enchyridion ad Laurentium, capitulo nono: « Satis est christiano, rerum creatarum causam visibilium sive invisibilium non nisi bonitatem credere Creatoris, qui est Deus unus et verus, nullamque esse naturam, quae non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso, eumque esse Trinitatem, Patrem scilicet et Filium et Spiritum santum ». Item Augustinus in sermone de Fide:[14] « Credimus, unum Deum unam esse divini nominis / Trinitatem ».

Essence or Divine Nature, and that the One God or Divine Essence is the Three Persons. Whence (St.) Augustine in the first book On the Trinity[11] thus says: « Rightly is God itself understood (to be) the Trinity, the blessed and only Powerful One ». Behold, how he expressly said "*God itself . . . the Trinity*", to show both that God itself is the Trinity and the Trinity God itself. Likewise in the same (book he says): « Dealing with those words », he says, « of the Apostle, which concern the advent of Christ he says:[12] *Whom He shall show, the blessed and only Powerful One, the King of kings and the Lord of lords, who alone has immortality* etc., neither has the Father nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit been properly named, but (rather) the blessed and only Powerful One, that is the One and Only True god, who is the Trinity itself ». Behold here also he openly says, that the One Only True God is the Trinity itself; and if the One God is the Trinity, therefore the One God is the Three Persons. Likewise in the fifth book On the Trinity:[13] « Not three gods, but the One God we say is the most outstanding Trinity itself ». Likewise in the book, which is called the Enchiridion to Lawrence, in the ninth chapter: « It is enough for the Christian, to believe that the cause of created things, visible and invisible, is not but the goodness of the Creator, who is the One and True God, and that there is no nature, which is not either He, or from Him, and that He is the Trinity, that is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit ». Likewise (St.) Augustine in the sermon on Faith:[14] « We believe, that the One God, the One Trinity belongs to the Divine Name ».

---

[1] Vat. hic addit *Deum*.
[2] Vat. male omittit *et*.
[3] Solummodo codd. B C D E *genuerit*, quod ponendum videretur, nisi paulo infra iidem codd. posuissent *genuit*.
[4] Cap. 2. n. 1, ubi pro *putant* et *errant* legitur in singulari *putant* etc., et codd. B C pro *eius potentiae* male legunt *eiusdem potentiae*.
[5] Omnes codd. *illam*.
[6] Sola Vat. male *alterum*.
[7] Edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 *hoc*.
[8] Codd. B C omittunt hic et mox post *Pater* particulam *et*.
[9] Codd. D E et edd. omnes, exceptis 1, 8, adiiciunt *tamen*.
[10] Vat. et ed. 4 addunt *et*; mox codd. C D *unam essentiam* pro *sive essentiam*.

[1] The Vatican edition here adds *God* [Deum].
[2] The Vatican edition badly omits *and* [et].
[3] Only codices B C D E have the subjunctive *begot* [genuerit], which seems must be posited, if a little below this the same codices had not put the indicative *begot* [genuit].
[4] Chapter 1, n. 1, where in place of *think* [putant] and *err* [errant] there are the singular forms of the verb, and codices B and C in place of *to His power* [eius potentiae] badly reads *to the Same's power* [eiusdem potentiae].
[5] All the codices read *that* [illam] instead of *that . . . of theirs* [istam].
[6] Only the Vatican edition badly reads neuter *the other (one)* [alterum].
[7] Editions 2, 3, 7 and 8 have *this* [hoc].
[8] Codices B and C omit here and just after *the Father*

[11] Cap. 6. n. 10, ubi et proximus locus, sed nonnullis omissis et mutatis.
[12] I. Tim. 6, 15. *Quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus* etc. Apud Augustinum: *Quem temporibus proriis ostendet Pater beatus* etc. Perperam mss. D E cum edd. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *ostendit* loco *ostendet*.
[13] Cap. 8. n. 9. Proximi loci citatio in omnibus mss. et edd., demptis Vat. et ed. 4, ita fertur: *Item in libro de Fide ad Petrum in expositione Symboli*; at perperam, cum verba subsequentia non in eo, sed in Enchyridion legantur.
[14] Serm. 233. de Fide Cathol. n. 1, sed paulo aliter, nempe: *Credimus in unum Deum . . . Hunc unum Deum et hanc unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem*.

[Pater] the particle *and* [et].
[9] Codices D and E and all the editions, except 1 & 8, add *however* [tamen].
[10] The Vatican edition and edition 4 add *and* [et]; then codices C and D read *one essence* [unam essentiam] in place of *or essence* [sive essentiam].
[11] Chapter 6, n. 10, where here and in the next quote not a few things have been omitted and changed.
[12] 1 Tim. 6:15: *Whom in His own time He shall show, the blessed* etc. [Quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus et.]. In (St.) Augustine's (writings it reads): *Whom at proper times the Father shall show, the blessed* etc. [Quem temporibus proriis ostendet Pater beatus]. Manuscripts D and E and editions 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9, have the erroneous *He shows* [ostendit] in place of *He shall show* [ostendet].
[13] Chapter 8, n. 9. The citation of the next quote in all the manuscripts and editions, excepting the Vatican edition and edition 4, is thus: *Likewise in the book On the Faith to Peter in the exposition of the Symbol* [Item in libro de Fide ad Petrum in expositione Sumboli]; but faultily, since the following words are not read in this (work)it, but (rather in) the Enchiridion.
[14] Sermon 233, On the Catholic Faith, n. 1, but in a slightly different manner, namely: *We believe in one God . . . That this one God and this one Trinity belong to the Divine Name* [Credimus in unum Deum . . . Hunc unum Deum et hanc unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem].

---

p. 96

Trinitatem ». Idem in sexto libro de Trinitate:[1] « Dicimus, Deum solum esse ipsam Trinitatem ». Ecce, his et aliis pluribus auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur, dicendum esse et credendeum, quod unus Deus est Trinitas, et una substantia tres personae; sicut e converso Trinitas dicitur esse unus Deus, et tres personae dicuntur esse una substantia.

(He says) the same in the sixth book On the Trinity:[1] « We say, that the only God is the Trinity itself ». Behold, by these and very many other authorities there is evidently shown, that it must be said and believed, that the One God is the Trinity, and the One Substance the Three Persons; just as conversely the Trinity is said to be the One God, and the Three Persons are said to be the One Substance.

Nunc ad praemissam quaestionem revertamur, ubi quaerebatur, an Deus Pater genuerit se Deum, an alium Deum. Ad quod dicimus, neutrum fore concedendum. Dicit tamen Augustinus in Epistola ad Maximum,[2] quod Deus Pater se alterum genuit, his verbis: « Pater, ut haberet Filium de se ipso, non minuit se ipsum, sed ita genuit de se alterum se, ut totus maneret in se et esset in Filio tantus, quantus et solus ». Quod ita intelligi potest, id est, de se alterum a se genuit, non utique alterum

Now let us turn back to the aforementioned question, where there was asked, whether God the Father begot Himself God, or whether (He begot) an other God. To which we say, neither is to be conceded. However (St.) Augustine says in the Letter to Maximus,[2] that God the Father begot Himself the other [se alterum], with these words: « The Father, so that He would have a Son from His very self, did not diminish His very self, but so begot from Himself the other-Himself [alterum se], so that He

Deum, sed alteram personam; vel *genuit se alterum*, id est, genuit alterum, qui hoc est quod ipse. Nam etsi alius sit Pater quam Filius, non est tamen aliud quam Filius, sed unum.

remains whole in Himself and is as much in the Son, as He also (is) alone ». Which can thus be understood, that is, that from Himself He begot the Other than [a] Himself, not indeed the other God, but the other Person; and/or *He begot Himself the other*, that is, He begot the Other, who is this which He Himself (is). For even if the Father is other than the Son, He is not, however, an other thing [aliud] than the Son, but one thing [unum] (with Him).

[1] Cap. 7. n. 9. — Immediate ante Vat. et edd. 1, 2 habent *item* pro *idem*; mox post *Ecce* Vat. et ed. 4 addunt *et*. Deinde codd. A B C D et edd. 1, 8 *concedendum* pro *credendum*, sed non bene nec congrue ad dua testimonia Augustini, qui loquitur tum de interiore fide (*Credimus*), tum de confesione fidei (*Dicimus*).

[2] Epistola 170. ad Maximum medicum, n. 5. — Paulo infra in explicatione verborum Augustini Vat. male omittit *a* post *de se alterum*.

[1] Chapter 7, n. 9. — Immediately before this the Vatican edition and editions 1 & 2 have *likewise* [item] in place of *the same* [idem]; then after *Behold* [Ecce] the Vatican edition and edition 1 add *also* [et]. Then codices A B C D and editions 1 & 8 have *conceded* [concedendum] in place of *believed* [credendum], but not well, nor congruous to the two testimonies of (St.) Augustine, who speaks both of interior faith (*We believe*) and of the confession of the faith (*We say*).

[2] Letter 170 to Maximus the doctor, n. 5. — A little below this in the explanation of the words of (St.) Augustine, the Vatican edition badly omits *by* [a] after *from Himself . . . the Other* [de se alterum].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV.

Questiones ex comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem concretum, ut nomen Deus.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV.

Questions from the comparison of generation to an essential, concrete term, such as the name "God".

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 96-99.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Hic oritur questio satis necessaria etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

In praecedenti distinctione probavit Magister Trinitatem et Unitatem per similitudines congruas et rationes. In praesenti distinctione ponitur secunda pars, in qua solvit incidentes dubitationes. Et incidit dubitatio ex hoc, quod in divinis est trinitas et unitas, et ita aliquid distinguens et distinctum, aliquid indistinctum, ut termini substantiales. Incidit ergo dubitatio ex comparatione proprietatis distinguentis ad terminum substantialem. Habet autem haec pars duas. In prima movet dubitationem ex comparatione proprietatis distinguentis ad substantiam vel essentiam; in secunda ad eius potentiam, infra distinctione sexta: *Praeterea quaeri solet*.

Item prima pars habet duas, quia substantia potest significari in *concretione*, ut per hoc nomen *Deus*, vel in *abstractione*, ut per hoc nomen *essentia*. Primo ergo movet quaestionem ex comparatione generationis ad hoc nomen *Deus*, secundo, ad hoc nomen *essentia*, infra distinctione quinta: *Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit* etc.

Haec autem distinctio habet quatuor particulas et hoc secundum quatuor, quae ibi tanguntur. In *prima*, supposito quod haec sit vera: Deus genuit Deum, quaeritur de hac: *Genuit se vel alium*, ad[1] quam solvit interimendo. In *secunda* quaerit de hac: *Genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, vel qui non est Deus Pater*, et ad hoc solvit distinguendo ex parte praedicati, et hoc ibi: *Sed adhuc oppununt*. In *tertia* quaerit de hac: *Deus est Trinitas*, et probat multis auctoritatibus, quod est vera, et hoc

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 96-99.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Here there arises a quite necessary question etc..

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In the preceding distinction Master (Peter) proved the Trinity and Unity through incongruous similitudes and reasons. In the present distinction there is posited a second part, in which he solves occurring doubts [incidentes dubitationes]. And a doubt occurs from this, that among the divine there is a Trinity and Unity, and thus something distinguishing and distinct, something else indistinct, such as [ut] the substantial terms. Therefore a doubt occurs from the comparison of the property of the one distinguishing to the substantial term. Moreover [autem] this part has two (parts). In the first he brings forth [movet] a doubt from a comparison of the property of the one distinguishing to the Substance and/or Essence; in the second to His power, below in the sixth distinction (where he says): *Moreover one is accustomed to ask*.

Likewise the first part has two (parts), because the Substance can be signified in *concretion*, as through this name "*God*", and/or in *abstraction*, as through this name "*essence*". Therefore first he brings forth a question from the comparison of generation to this name "*God*", second, to this name "*essence*", below in the Fifth Distinction (where he says): *After these there is asked, whether it must be conceded* etc..

Moreover this distinction has four subparts and this according to the four, which are touched upon there. In the *first*, having supposed that these (words) are true: "God begot God", there is asked concerning this: "*He begot Himself and/or another*", regarding[1] which he solves by interemption. In the *second* there is asked concerning this: "*He begot the God, who is God the Father, or who is not God the Father*", and regarding this he solves by distinguishing on the part of the predicate,

occasione praedictorum, ibi: *Quidam tamen veritatis adversarii*. In *quarta* ad suum propositum redit, scilicit ad primo quaesitum; ad primum videlicet[2] addens primae solutioni, quod quamvis non sit concedendum: *Genuit se, vel alium* divisim, tamen potest concedi coniunctim, ibi: *Nunc ad praemissam quaestionem*.

and this there (where he says): *But . . . still oppose*. In the *third* he asks concerning this: "*God is the Trinity*", and he proves by many authorities, that it is true, and this by the occasion of the aforesaid, there (where he says): *However certain adversaries of the truth*. In the *fourth* he returns to his proposal, that is to the thing first sought; regarding the first, namely[2], adding to the solution of the first, that although there must not be conceded: "*He begot Himself, and/or another*" disjunctively [divisim], however it can be conceded conjunctively, there (where he says): *Now . . . to the aforementioned question*.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae tangit Magister in praesenti distinctione, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo, utrum haec locutio sit concedenda in divinis: Deus genuit Deum.

Secundo, utrum unitas essentiae admittat hanc locutionem: Deus genuit alium Deum, vel Deus est alius a Deo.

Tertio quaeritur de consignificatione[3] huius nominis *Deus*, utrum videlicet grammatice possimus dicere plures deos.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de suppositione istius nominis *Deus*, utrum supponat pro persona vel pro essentia.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of those (things) which Master (Peter) touches upon in the present distinction, four (questions) are asked.

First, whether this saying must be conceded among the divine: "God begot God".

Second, whether the Unity of the Essence admits of this saying: "God begot another God, and/or there is a God other than God [alius a Deo] ".

Third there is asked concerning the consignification[3] of this name "*God*", whether, namely, we can say grammatically (that there are) more gods.

Fourth and last there is asked concerning the supposition of this His name "*God*", whether it supposes for a Person and/or for an Essence.

---

[1] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *ad*.
[2] Codd. et ed. 1 contra Vat. addunt *ad primum videlicet*.
[3] Auctoritate plurimorum mss. ut A F G K T etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *consignificatione* pro *significatione* et *Deus* loco *Dii* ac mox *istius* pro *illius*.

[1] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 omits *regarding* [ad].
[2] The codices and edition 1, contrary to the Vatican edition, add *regarding the first, namely* [ad primum videlicet].
[3] On the authority of very many manuscripts, such as A F G K T etc., and edition 1 we have substituted *consignification* for *signification* and *God* in place of *Gods* and then *of this, His* [istius] in place of *of that* [illius].

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

De comparatione nominis Deus ad

ARTICLE SOLE

On the comparison of the name "God" to

generationem et de eius consignificatione et suppositione.

Quaestio I.

Utrum haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda,

1. Videtur per hoc quod dicitur in Symbolo: *Deum de Deo*; sed hoc non est nisi per generationem:[1] ergo Deus generatur de Deo: ergo ista locutio est concedenda: Deus genuit Deum.

2. Item, generatio est respectu similis in natura, unde « homo generat hominem »;[2] unde si in divinis est generatio, producitur similis in natura: ergo cum Pater sit Deus, non generat nisi Deum: ergo haec est vera: Deus generat Deum.

3. Item, quidquid habet Filius, aut habet a se, aut ab alio; sed habet deitatem, et non a se, quia sic esset ingenitus: ergo habet ab alio; sed non habet nisi per generationem, et[3] non habet deitatem nisi ab habente deitatem, et habens deitatem est Deus: ergo etc.

CONTRA: 1. Hoc nomen *Deus* significat essentiam sive substantiam, cum sit terminus substantialis;[4] sed haec non conceditur, immo est falsa: essentia generat essentiam: ergo similiter et ista: Deus genuit Deum.

2. Item, hoc nomen *Deus* aut supponit pro omni persona, aut determinate pro aliqua. Si determinate pro aliqua: ergo restringitur eius significatio[5] ab aliquo, nec est dare, quod ab alio nisi ab hoc verbo *genuit* vel *generat*. Sed regula est, quod terminus, positus in praedicato, non restringit terminum a parte subiecti ratione significationis: ergo stat pro omni persona. Non ergo videtur locutio vera, secundum quod accipitur pro persona Filii: ergo etc.

3. Item, iste terminus *Deus*, quantum est de

generation and on its consignification and supposition.

Question 1

Whether this saying: "God begot God", must be conceded.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that this saying: "God begot God", must be conceded,

1. Seems through that which is said in the Creed [in Symbolo]: "*God from God*" [Deum de Deo]; but this is naught but through generation:[1] therefore God is generated from God: therefore that saying of his must be conceded: "God begot God".

2. Likewise, generation is in respect of one similar in nature, whence « man generates man »;[2] whence if among the divine there is generation, one Similar in nature is produced: therefore since the Father is God, He generates naught but God: therefore this (saying) is true: "God generates God".

3. Likewise, whatever the Son has, He either has from Himself, or from an other; but He has deity, and not from Himself, because He would thus be unbegotten: therefore He has it from an other; but He has naught but through generation, and[3] He does not have deity except from One having deity, and the One having deity is God: ergo etc..

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. This name "*God*" signifies an essence or substance, since it is a substantial term;[4] but this is not conceded, nay rather it is false: "the Essence generates an essence": therefore similarly also that (saying) of his: "God begot God".

2. Likewise, this name "*God*" either supposes [supponit] for every Person, or determinately for some one (Person). If determinately for Someone: therefore its signification[5] is restricted by Someone, nor is it to be granted, that (it is) by an Other except by this word "*begot*" and/or "*generates*". But the rule is, that the term, posited in the predicate, does not restrict the term on the part of the subject according to a reckoning of signification: therefore it stands for every Person. Therefore the saying does not seem true, according to which it is accepted for the Person of the Son: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, that term "*God*", as much as it

se, aeque bene supponit pro Filio, sicut[6] pro Patre: ergo cum Filii sit *non generare*, sicut et Patris est *generare*, si haec est vera: Deus generat, pro Patre, eadem ratione et haec: Deus non generat, pro Filio; si ergo haec non conceditur, nec prima.

concerns itself, supposes equally well for "the Son", as[6] for "the Father": therefore since it belongs to the Son *not to generate*, just as it belongs to the Father *to generate*, if this is true: 'God generates', for the Father, by the same reason also (is) this: 'God does not generate', for the Son; if therefore this is not conceded, neither (is) the first.

4. Item, contradictorie opposita sunt vera de quolibet sub distinctione, quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio:[7] ergo si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Pater, aut Deum qui non est Pater. Si Deum qui est Pater, ergo genitus est generans; si Deum qui non est Pater; sed quod implicatur contingit simpliciter inferri, ut si dicatur: homo qui non currit, disputat: ergo homo non currit: ergo similiter, si genuit Deum qui non est Pater, Deus non est Pater; sed si non est Pater, non generat: ergo etc.[8]

4. Likewise, in a contradictory manner opposites are true of anything [quolibet] under a distinction, because of anything (there can be) an affirmation and/or a negation:[7] therefore if "God begot God", either (the latter is) the God who is the Father, or a God who is not the Father. If the God who is the Father, therefore, the One generating has been begotten; if the God who is not the Father; but what is implied happens to be inferred simply, as if there is said: "the man, who does not run", one reckons [disputat]: 'therefore, the man does not run': therefore, similarly, if He begot a God who is not the Father, God is not the Father; but if He is not the Father, He does not generate: ergo etc..[8]

---

[1] Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *generationem* loco *gignitionem*.
[2] Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. 8.): In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur . . . homo namque hominem generat. Cfr. II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.).
[3] Multi codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum sex primis edd. *sed* loco *et*. Cod. R hanc propositionem ita exhibet: *per generationem vel ab habente deitatem, sed habens*.
[4] De significatione et suppositione huius hominis *Deus*, in quibus haec et seqq. obiectiones fundantur, vide infra q. 4. — In fine argumenti plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum ed. 1 *generat* pro *genuit*.
[5] Codd. D K O (T ff in marg.) *suppositio*, quod et infra in responsione ad hanc obiectionem fere omnes codd. et sex primae edd. habent pro *significatio*; cod. I *significatio vel suppositio*. Sed vide regulam paulo infra ex Petr. Hisp. allatam. Mox multi codd. et ed. 1 *non* loco *nec*; cod. R *sed non*. Dein post *significationis* cod. X addit *sed consignificationis*, quod concordat cum regulae istius explicatione proposita a Petro Hispano, Summula, tract. de Restrictione: Nihil positum a parte pradicati potest restringere terminum communem positum a parte subiecti quoad principalem eius significationem, ut homo est albus . . . Dico autem, quoad principalem eius significationem, quia praedictatum restringit subiectum quoad consignificationem, quae est genus v. g. masculinum.
[6] Aliqui codd. ut T Z cum ed. 1 addunt *et*. Paulo

[1] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have put *generation* [generationem] in place of *begetting* [gignitionem].
[2] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 28 (Bk. VI, n. 8): For even in certain things it is also manifest, that such as is the one generating, so that which is generated . . . for man generates man. Cf. On the Soul, Bk. II, text 34 (ch. 4).
[3] Many codices as A F G I K T etc. together with the six first editions have *but* [sed] in place of *and* [et]. Codex R exhibits this proposition thus: *through generation and/or by One having deity, but One having* [per generationem vela b habente deitatem, sed habens]
[4] On the signification and substitution of this name "*God*" [Deus], in which this and the following objections are founded, see below q. 4. — At the end of the argument very many codices as A F G I K T etc. together with edition 1 have *generates* [generat] in place of *begot* [genuit]
[5] Codices D H O (T and ff in the margin) have *supposition* [suppositio], which also below in the response to this objection nearly all the codices and the six first editions have in place of *signification* [significationis]; cod. I reads *signification and/or supposition* [signification vel suppositio]. But see the rule a little below taken from Peter of Spain. Then many codices and edition 1 have *not* [non] in place of *nor* [nec]; codex R has *but not* [sed non]. Then after *of the signification* [significationis] codex X adds *but of the consignification* [sed consignificationis], which agrees with the explanation

infra post *sicut* codd. H Y omittunt *et*. Mox cod. Y *ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima*. Codd. aa bb circa finem argumenti: *sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima*; ed. 1 *nec prima debet concedi*; cod. Z *si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre*. — Plures codd. ut A C G I L M R S U ff hoc tertium argumentum oimittunt, sed indebite, sicut patet ex responsione infra posita; cod. O vero illud praecedenti argumento circa finem post *omni persona* interserit sub hac forma: *Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo* etc. Eadem fere verba exhibet cod. Z in fine huius tertii argumenti.

[7] Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 6. et II. c. 3, ubi agit de affirmatione, negatione et contradictione; et VI. Topic. c. 3. circa medium (c. 6.), ubi dicit: *Nam de omni aut affirmatio, aut negatio vera est*; et tandem IV. Metaph. text. 15. (III. 4.): *De omni affirmatio, aut negatio*. Ultimum textum et II. Periherm. c. 3. videnter codd. cum ed. 1 respexisse, omittendo *vera est*, quod Vat. adiungit. Paulo infra in Vat. desiderantur verba *si Deum* usque ad *sed quod*, quae tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habentur.

[8] Cod. O hic addit novum argumentum: *Item, si Deus generat Deum, Deus est genitus a Deo: ergo Deus est distinctus a Deo; ergo sunt duo dii*.

of that rule proposed by Peter of Spain, Summula, tract on Restriction: Nothing posited on the part of the predicate can restrict a common term posited on part of the subject in regard to its principle signification, such as “man is white” . . . Moreover I say, in regard to its principle signification, that the predicate restricts the subject in regard to the consignification, which is the gender, v. g. the masculine.

[6] Some codices as T and Z together with edition 1 add *also* [et]. A little below this after *just as* [sicut] codices Y and Y omit *also* [et]. Then codex Y reads *therefore if this is true for the Father, so shall it be true for the Son, that is "God does not generate"; if therefore this is not conceded for the Son, neither (is) the first* [ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima.]. Codices aa and bb near the end of the argument read: *but this is not conceded, therefore neither (is) the first* [sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima]; edition 1 has *neither ought the first be conceded* [nec prima debet concedi]; codex Z reads *if therefore this is not conceded for the Son, equally neither is that conceded for the Father* [si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre.]. — Very many codices, such as A C G I L M R S U and ff, omit this third argument, but unduly, as is clear from the response put below; however codex O near the end of the preceding argument after *every person* [omni persona] inserts it under this form: *Likewise, if this is true: "God generates God", for the person of the Father, much more strongly will there be true: "God does not generate God", for the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; therefore by the destruction of the consequents, if this in no manner must be conceded, neither (is) that one. Therefore the saying* etc. [Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo]. Codex Z exhibits nearly the same words at the end of this third argument.

[7] Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 6 and Bk. II, ch. 3, where he deals with affirmation, negation and contradiction; and Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 3 near the middle (ch. 6), where he says: *For of everything either the affirmation, or the negation, is true* [Nam de omni aut affirmation, aut negation vera est]; and also Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 15 (Bk. III, n. 4): *Of everything the affirmation, or negation* [Deo omni affirmation, aut negatio]. The codices and edition 1 seem to refer to this last text and to On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 3, though omitting *is true* [vera est], which the Vatican edition adjoins. A little below this the Vatican edition is lacking the words *If the God* up to *but because* [si Deum . . . sed quod], which, however, are had in the manuscripts and edition 1.

[8] Codex O here adds a new argument: *Likewise, if God generates God, God is begotten by God: therefore God is distinct from God; therefore there are two gods* [Item, si Deus generat Deum, Deus est

genitus a Deo: ergo Deus est distinctus a Deo; ergo sunt duo dii].

p. 98

CONCLUSIO.

Recte dicitur: Deum genuisse Deum, quod quatuor regulis probatur.

CONCLUSION

It is rightly said: that God begot God, which is proven by the four rules.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, salva essentiae unitate, recipitur tam a magistris quam a Sanctis. Ad cuius intelligentiam quatuor regulae sunt notandae.

I respond: It must be said, that the aforesaid saying, saving the unity of the Essence, is received as much as by the masters (of theology) as by the Saints. For the understanding of which, four rules must be noted.

Prima est, quod nomen *abstractum* imponitur formae et a forma, ut albedo imponitur ipsi albedini[1] et a forma albedinis; nomen vero *concretum* imponitur a forma, sed non formae, sed supposito: ut album imponitur a forma albedinis, sed non formae, sed supposito, ut alicui rei albae, homini vel cygno.

The *first* is, that an *abstract* name is imposed upon a form and by a form, as whiteness is imposed upon whiteness itself[1] and by the form of whiteness; however a *concrete* name is imposed by a form, but not upon a form, rather [sed] upon a supposit: as white is imposed by the form of whiteness, but not upon a form, rather upon a supposit, as upon any white thing, man and/or swan.

Secunda regula est, quod terminus habens multitudinem suppositorum, sine distributione acceptus, stat pro illo, pro quo reddit locutionem veram, ut cum dicitur: homo currit, vera est locutio pro currente, si aliquis sit currens.

The *second* rule is, that a term having a multitude of supposits, (and) accepted without distribution, stands for that, for which it renders the saying true, as when there is said: "man runs", the saying is true for the one running, if there is anyone running.

Tertia regula est, quod termino habenti formam non multiplicabilem non differt praeponere et postponere negationem. Unde non differt dicere: Petrus non currit, et, non Petrus currit.

The *third* rule is, that placing a negation before and after a term having a non-multipliable form, makes no difference [non differt]. Whence it makes no difference to say: "Peter does not run", and "not Peter runs".

Quarta regula est ista, quod relativum refert antecedens sub eodem modo supponendi, sub quo antecedens praecessit ipsum relativum, nisi faciat relationem simplicem.[2]

The *fourth* rule is this, that a relative refers to an antecedent under the same manner of supposing, under which the antecedent precedes the relative itself, unless it forms [faciat] a simple relation.

1. Ex prima regula patet responsio ad primum. Cum enim iste terminus *Deus* sit concretus, etsi[3] imponatur a forma essentiali, scilicet deitate, tamen imponitur personae sive supposito, sicut album imponitur ab albedine rei albae; et ideo supponit et reddit locutionem veram pro persona, non pro forma. Hoc autem nomen *essentia* vel *deitas* est abstractum, et ideo

1. From the first rule the response to the first is clear. For since that term "*God*" is concrete, even if[3] it was imposed by an essential form, that is by deity, it is, however, imposed upon a Person or Supposit, as white is imposed by whiteness upon a white thing; and for that reason it supposes (on behalf of one or the other) and renders the saying true for a Person, not for

imponitur formae et a forma, sicut albedo, et ideo essentiam significat et supponit. Et ideo haec est falsa: essentia generat essentiam, quia generatio non est formae, sed suppositi;[4] sed haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum, pro persona.

a form. Moreover, this name “*essence*” and/or “*deity*” is abstract, and for that reason it is imposed upon a form and by a form, as whiteness (is), and for that reason it signifies the Essence and supposes (for It). And for that reason this is false: “the Essence generates an essence”, because generation does not belong to a form, but to a supposit;[4] but this is true: “God begot God”, (because “God” supposes) for a Person.

2. Ex secunda regula patet responsio ad secundum. Quamvis enim significatio termini non arctetur, tamen pro illo stat, pro quo est locutio vera, ut *homo currit*, pro Petro vel Ianne, si pro illo, est locutio vera; nec tamen ad illum restringitur. Et hoc patet, quia si addatur distributio, confundet[5] illum terminum pro omnibus; sed si esset restrictus, non confunderet nisi pro illis, ad quos se extenderet restrictio. Unde aliud est *terminum restringi ad unum*, aliud est *reddere locutionem veram pro uno*.

2. From the second rule the response to the second is clear. For although the signification of the term is not constrained [arctetur], however, it stands for that, for which the saying is true; nor, yet, is it restricted to that. And this is clear, because if there is added a distribution, it will confound[5] that term for all; but if it were restricted, it would not confound except for those, to which the restriction would extend itself. Whence that *the term is restricted to one* is one thing, that *it renders the saying true for one* is another.

3. Ex tertia regula patet solutio[6] ad tertium. Licet enim haec sit vera pro Patre: Deus generat Deum, tamen haec: Deus non generat Deum, non est vera pro Filio. Cum enim iste terminus *Deus* dicat formam immultiplicabilem, non differt ei praeponere negationem et postponere; et ideo cum negatio praeposita[7] omnino a subiecto removeat praedicatum, sic et negatio postposita removet totaliter praediatum ab hoc termino *Deus*, cum dicitur: Deus non generat, quia removet a quolibet supposito. Et ideo alium modum habet supponendi in affirmativa quam in negativa, quia in affirmativa erat locutio vera pro Patre; in negativa vero non potest esse veritas, quia negatio removet totaliter praedicatum illud.

3. From the third rule the solution[6] to the third is clear. For though this be true for the Father: “God generates God”, however this: “God does not generate God”, is not true for the Son. For since that term “*God*” means an unmultipliable form, it makes no difference to place a negation before or [et] after it; and for that reason since a negation placed before (it)[7] entirely removes the predicate from the subject, so also a negation placed after (it) totally removes the predicate from this term “*God*”, since there is said: “God does not generate”, because it removes it from any Supposit. And for this reason it has another manner of supposing in the affirmative than in the negative, because in the affirmative the saying is true for the Father; however in the negative there cannot be truth, because the negation totally removes that predicate.

4. Ex quarta regula patet quartum. Cum enim relativum omnino habeat suppositionem antecedentis, et iste terminus *Deus*[8] in praedicato supponat pro Deo genito, relativum refert pro illo. Et ita sensus est: Deus genuit Deum, qui Deus genitus est Pater, vel non est Pater; et haec est vera pro negativa, nec licet inferre: ergo Deus non est Pater; quia mutatur suppositio, immo est ibi figura dictionis.[9]

4. From the fourth rule the fourth (solution) is clear. For since an entirely relative (term) is had as a substitute for the antecedent, and that term “God”[8] in the predicate supposes for “the begotten God”, (and as) a relative refers to Him [pro illo]. And thus the sense is: “God begot the God, which begotten God is the Father, and/or is not the Father”; and this is true for the negative (part), nor is it licit to infer: “therefore God

is not the Father"; because the supposition is changed, nay rather there it is a figure of speech.[9]

SCHOLION.

I. In gratiam lectorum, qui in antiqua logica minus sunt exercitati, iuvat hic ponere explicationem aliquorum terminorum, quae in hac quaestione et alibi in hoc opere saepe occurrunt. Sumtae sunt hae et aliae multae alibi in notis positae explicationes magna ex parte ex Summulis Petri Hispani, quae tempore S. Bonaventurae in manibus scholarium erant. Postquam Petrus multa de rebus philosophicis et medicina scripsit, a. 1275 electus est in Summum Pontificem et assumsit nomen Ioannis XXI. Mortuus est 16. Maii 1277. Plura videri possunt in quovis libro de logica scholastica tractante.

1. Aliud est *significatio*, aliud *suppositio* alicuius termini. Significatio est repraesentatio rei per vocem et convenit omnibus vocabulis tam substantivis quam reliquis, sive in propositione, sive extra propositionem.

Suppositio, ut vult Petrus Hisp., tract de suppositione, « est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo », intellige, de quo / vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur.

SCHOLIUM

I. For the sake of the readers, who are less exercised in the ancient logic, it helps here to put an explanation of the ancient terms, which in this question and elsewhere in this work often occur. These and many others elsewhere in the notes are explanations taken mostly from the Summulae of Peter of Spain, which in the time of St. Bonaventure were in the hands of scholars. Afterwards Peter (Giuliano) wrote much concerning things philosophical and medical, (and) in the year 1275 was elected as Supreme Pontiff and assumed the name John XXI. He died on May 16th, 1277. More (information on these matters) can be seen in any book treating of scholastic logic.

1. *Signification* is one thing, the *supposition* of any term, another. Signification is the representation of a thing through the voice and it befits all words both substantive and otherwise, whether in a proposition, or outside a proposition.

Supposition, as Peter of Spain would have it in his "Tract on Supposition", « is the acceptance of a substantive term on behalf of something », concerning which . . .

---

[1] Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt *ipsi albedini et*, sed male, uti ex contextu patet.
[2] Praedictarum regularum prima insinuatur ab Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 21. et 27. ac IX. Metaph. text. 12. (VI. c. 6. 8. et VII. c. 7.); secunda habetur in Petri Hisp. Summula, tract. de Suppos. et Distrib.; terita in opusculo, quod etiam Petro Hisp. attribuitur, scil. Parvorum Logicalium, tract. de Negat. et Affirm. c. 4; quarta in eius dem Summula, tract. de Relativis.
[3] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *etsi* loco *et*. Mox cod. X post *deitate* habet *non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae*.
[4] Ex illo generali principio: Actiones sunt suppositorum.
[5] Id est, facit supponere. — Paulo ante Cod. R *subiectum* pro *illum*.
[6] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus *responsio* in *solutio* et paulo post *non multiplicabilem* in *immultiplicabilem*.
[7] Vat. contra antiquirores codd. et ed. 1 addit *totaliter et*.
[8] Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *Deus*. Paulo ante cod. K modo negativo *relativum non habeat suppositionem aliam a sui antecedente*.
[9] Cod. K addit *sicut hic: Deus genitus non est*

[1] Very many codices together with the six first editions omit *whiteness itself and* [ipsi albedini est], but badly, as is clear from the context.
[2] The first of the aforesaid rules is hinted at by Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, texts 21 and 27, and Bk. IX, text 12 (Bk. VI, ch. 6 and 8, and Bk. VIII, ch. 7); the second is had in Peter of Spain's, Summula, Tract on Supposition and Distribution; the third in the smaller work, which is also attributed to Peter of Spain, namely, Parvorum Logicalium, Tract on Negation and Affirmation, ch. 4; the fourth in the Summula, Tract on Relatives.
[3] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *even if* [etsi] in place of *et* [and]. Then codex X after *deity* [deitate] has *it is not, however, imposed upon a form, but rather upon a person* [non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae].
[4] From that general principle: Actions belong to supposits.
[5] That is, it causes it to substitute. — A little before this Codex R has *subject* [subiectum] in place of *that* [illum].
[6] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have changed *response* [responsio] into *solution* [solutio] and a little after this *non multipliable* [non multipclicabilem] into *unmultipliable*

Pater: ergo Deus non est Pater.

[immultiplicabilem].
[7] The Vatican edition against the more ancient codices and edition 1 adds here *totally and* [totatliter et].
[8] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *God* [Deus]. A little before this codex K in a negative manner has *the relative may have a supposition other than its antecedent* [*relativum non habeat suppositionem aliam a sui antecedente*]
[9] Codex K adds *such as here: "The begotten God is not the Father: therefore God is not the Father"* [sicut hic: Deus genitus non est Pater: ergo Deus non est Pater].

---

vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur. Sic terminus *homo* potest supponere vel pro homine in *communi*, ut in propositione: homo est species; vel pro suis *inferioribus* sub hac specie comprehensis, v. g. homo currit. Suppositionum alia est *communis*, alia *discreta*; illa fit per terminum communem, ut homo est mortalis; haec per terminum discretum (concretum), ut *Socrates*, vel per communem, sed determinatum per pronomen demonstrativum, ut *iste homo*.

and/or which (things) a term of this kind in any proposition is verified. Thus the term "*man*" can substitute [supponere] for man in *common*, as in the proposition: "man is a species"; and/or for his *inferiors* comprehended under this species, v. g. "a man runs". Of suppositions one is *common*, the other *discrete*; the former is done through a common term, such as "man is mortal"; the latter is through a discrete (concrete) term, such as "*Socrates*", and/or through a common one, but determined through the demonstrative pronoun, as (in) "*that man*" [iste homo].

Aliae divisiones suppositionis apud S. Bonav. occurrentes sunt: suppositio *simplex* et *personalis*. Illa est acceptatio termini communem, ut cum dicitur: homo est species; animal est genus. Tunc terminus homo supponit pro homine in communi, et non pro quolibet inferiore; unde non licet facere *decensum*, uti dicut, sic arguendo: homo est species: ergo aliquis homo est species. *Personalis* vero suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut cum dicitur: homo currit; hic iste terminus *homo* supponit pro suis inferioribus. — Personalium suppositionum alia est *determinata*, alia est *confusa*. *Determinata* est acceptio termini communis indefinite sumti, vel cum signo *particulari*, ut *homo currit*, vel *aliquis homo currit*; et dicitur determinata, quia licet in utraque istarum propositionum ille terminus *homo* supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente, propositio est vera; et

The other divisions of supposition occurring in St. Bonaventure's (writings) are: *simple* and *personal* (i.e. as a hypostasis). The former is the common acceptation of a term, as when there is said: "man is a species"; "animal is a genus". Here the term "man" substitutes for man in common, and for any inferior; whence it is not licit to make a *descent*, as one says, by arguing thus: 'man is a species: therefore some man is a species'. However *personal* supposition is the acceptance of a common term for its inferiors, as when there is said: "man runs"; here that term "*man*" substitutes for its inferiors. — Of personal suppositions one is *determinate*, the other is *confused*. *Determinate* (substitution) is the acceptance of a common term taken indefinitely, and/or with a *particular* sign, such as "*a man runs*", and/or "*some man runs*"; and it is called determinate, because though in each of those propositions that term "*man*" substitutes for every man, both

quia aliud est *supponere* et aliud *locutionem veram vel falsam esse* pro aliquo, igitur in praedictis iste terminus homo *supponit* pro omni homine currente et non currente, licet reddat *locutionem veram* pro uno solo currente . . . *Confusa* suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus, mediante signo *universali*, ut cum dicitur: omnis homo est animal; quia supponit terminus homo pro quolibet suo supposito. Ita Petrus Hisp.; alii quoad *confusam* et *determinatam* suppositionem rem paulo aliter explicant.

the one running and the one not running, however when only one man is running, the proposition is true; and because it is one thing *to substitute* and another that *a saying is true and/or false* for something, therefore in the aforesaid that term "man" *substitutes* for "every man running and not running", though *it renders the saying true* for only one running . . . A *confused* supposition is the acceptance of a common term for very many, by means of a *universal* sign, as when there is said: "every man is an animal"; because the term "man" substitutes for any of its supposits. Thus Peter of Spain; others in regard to *confused* and *determinate* supposition explain the matter a little otherwise.

2. *Distributio* est acceptio termini *communis* pro suis significatis, sive est multiplicatio termini *communis* virtute alicuius signi universalis, v. g. in propositione: omnis homo currit, terminus *homo* distribuitur (sive *confunditur*) pro omnibus hominibus virtue illius vocabuli *omnis*, quod *signum distributivum* appellatur.

2. *Distribution* is the acceptance of a *common* term for those it signifies, or it is the multiplication of a *common* term by virtue of any universal sign, v. g. in the proposition: "every man runs", the term "*man*" is distributed (or *confounded*) for every man by virtue of that word *every* which is called a *distributive sign*.

3. *Restrictio* est coarctatio termini communis a maiore suppositione sive extensione ad minorem; sic *homo albus* non significat omnes homines, sed partem eorum.

3. *Restriction* is the constraining [coarctatio] of a common term by a greater substitution or extension to a lesser; as "*white man*" does not signify all men, but a portion of them.

4. *Reddere locutionem veram* significat, quod in propositione, in qua subiectum supponit pro pluribus disiunctive, sensus redditur verus per hoc, quod in uno saltem supposito verificatur; v. g. propositio: homo currit, redditur vera, currente uno qualicumque. Unde *reddere locutionem veram* differt a *restrictione* termini ad unum, ut bene dicit S. Bonav., hic ad 2.

4. "*To render a saying true*" signifies, that in a proposition, in which the subject substitutes disjunctively for very many, the sense is rendered true through this, that in at least one supposit it is verified; v. g. the proposition: "man runs", is rendered true, with any one (man) running. Whence "*to render a saying true*" differs from the *restriction* of the term to one, as St. Bonaventure well says, here at n. 2.

II. His suppositis, quatuor regulae logicales in corp. positae earumque applicatio in solutione obiectorum facile intelliguntur. Sic verba (ad 2.): « quia si addatur distributio, confundet illum terminum pro omnibus », hunc sensum habent: si additur signum *omnis* termino *homo*, tunc confundet i. e. distribuet illum terminum, ita ut verificetur de omnibus hominibus; si

II. With these things supposed, the four logical rules posited in the body and their application in the solution of the objections are easily understood. Thus the words (at n. 2): « because if there is added a distribution, it will confound that term for all », has this sense: if there is added the sign "*every*" to the term "*man*", then it will confound, i. e. distribute, that term, so that

vero terminus *homo* restringitur per *albus*, tunc non « confunderet nisi pro albis hominibus ». — Pro intelligentia applicationis quartae regulae est notandum, quod est duplex relatio pronominis relativi ad suum nomen, scil. relatio *simplex* vel *personalis*. Per relationem *simplicem* pronomen relativum (qui, quae, quod) non refertur ad idem numero antecedens sive ad idem suppositum, bene vero per relationem *personalem*. Exemplum: « Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit »; hic relativum *quae* habet relationem simplicem, non personalem, quia alia mulierum persona damnavit, nempe Eva, alia salvavit, scil. Ss. Virgo Maria. Unde S. Doctor recte concludit, quod in illata obiectione est *figura dictionis* i. e. fallacia figurae dictionis, quia terminus sumitur sub diversa suppositione. De hoc plura vide dub. 3. huius dist., Alex. Hal., p. I. . 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 4. Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.

it shall be verified for all men; however if the term “*man*” is restricted by “*white*”, then it will not « confound except for white men ». — For an understanding of the application of the fourth rule it must be noted, that there is a twofold relation of a relative pronoun to its noun, that is a *simple* and/or *personal* relation. Through a *simple* relation the relative pronoun (“who”, “which”, “what”) is not referred to the same antecedent in number or to the same supposit, however (it is) rightly (referred) through the *personal* relation. An example: « She has damned us, who has saved us: a woman! » [Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit]; this relative *who* [quae] has a simple relation, not a personal one, because one person among women damned, namely Eve, an other saved, that is the Most Holy Virgin Mary. Whence the Seraphic Doctor rightly concludes, that in the objection brought forth there is a *figure of speech*, i. e. a fallacy of a figure of speech, because the term is taken under a diverse supposition. Concerning this see the very many (things said) in dubium 3 of this distinction, (and) in Alexander of Hales’, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, q. 2, §. 4, (and) in Richard of Middletown, here in q. 1.

III. Contra applicationem tertiae regulae ad Deum moverunt subtilem difficultatem Durand. (hic q. 2.), Aureol., Brulifer (hoc loco) aliique posteriores Scholastici. Negant enim, quod *Deus* sit proprie terminus singularis, cum aliquod modo sit etiam terminus communis, quod etiam S. Bonav. (infra q. 4.) concedit. Inde concludunt, propositionem: Deus non generat Deum, posse concedi. Probatiores vero theologi, ut S. Thomas (S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 3.), Richard. (hic q. 1.) aliique cum nostro Seraphico (hic a. 3.) locutionem hanc recte improbant. Cfr. Caietanus ad loc. S. Thomae. cit.

III. Against the application of the third rule to “God”, Durandus (here in q. 2), Aureolus, Brulifer (at this point) and other later Scholastics bring forward a subtle difficulty. For they deny that “*God*” is properly a singular term, since in some manner it may also be a common term, which even St. Bonaventure (below in q. 4) concedes. Hence they conclude, that the proposition: “God does not generate God”, can be conceded. However more approved theologians, such as St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4, at n. 3), Richard (here in q. 1) and others together with our Seraphic Doctor (here in q. 3) disapprove rightly of this saying. Cf. Cajetan's commentary on this passage of St. Thomas.

IV. Quoad quaestionis solutionem omnes antiqui conveniunt. Cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 9. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 1. 4. — Scot., hic q. 1. ad 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 4. — B.

IV. In regard to the solution of the question all the ancients agree. Cf. St. Bonaventure, below in d. 9, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 1. 4. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1, at n. 1.

Albert., hic a. 6. 7.; de hac et seqq. qq., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 51. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. et 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. qq., S. a. 54. q. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. aa. hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

— St. Thomas, here in q. 1 & 2; Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 6 & 7.; on this and the following qq., Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 51. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1 and 3. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1. — Giles the Roman, on this and the following q. here in the 2. princ. of the sole question. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following qq., Summa., a. 54, q. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following qq. here in q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following aa. here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following question, here in q. 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 99-101.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

ARTICLE I

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 99-101.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum admitti possit haec locutio: Deus

QUESTION 2

Whether this saying can be admitted: “God

generat alium Deum.

generates another God".

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum unitas essentiae admittat hanc: Deus generat alium Deum. Et quod non, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the Unity of the Essence admits this: "God generates another God" [Deus generat alium Deum]. And it seems that (it does) not.

1. Anselmus de Processione Spiritus sancti:[1] « Cum dicimus Deum de Deo, non intelligimus alium Deum, sed eundem de se ipso ».
2. Item, si genuit alium Deum; sed ubi est unus et alius, ibi sunt duo: ergo si genuit alium, sunt duo dii.

3. Item, alius dicit alietatem in generali: ergo cum generale specificetur per adiunctum, hoc nomen *Deus* specificat ipsum; sed si specificat, specificat ratione formae: ergo notatur alietas in forma; ergo non est admittenda talis locutio, cum non sit ibi alietas in forma.

1. (St.) Anselm <u>On the Procession of the Holy Spirit</u> (says):[1] « When we say "God from God", we do not understand another God, but the Same from His very self ».
2. Likewise, if He begot another God; but where there is one and another, there are two: therefore if He begot another, there are two gods.

3. Likewise, "another" means otherness in general: therefore since the general is specified through an adjunct, this name "*God*" specifies Him; but if it specifies, it specifies by reason of a form: therefore there is noted otherness in form; therefore such a saying must not be admitted, since otherness in form is not there.

SED CONTRA: Generatio importat distinctionem;[2] sed distinctio alietatem aliquam: ergo et generatio; ergo si haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum, et haec per consequens: Deus distinguitur a Deo, vel genuit alium Deum. *Si dicas*, quod non sequatur, quia generare importat distinctionem ut *modum* sed distingui vel esse alium ut *rem*; *contra*: ad consequentiam . . .

ON THE CONTRARY: Generation conveys a distinction;[2] but distinction (conveys) some otherness: therefore generation also (does); therefore if this is true: "God begot God", these also (are true) consequently [per consequens]: "God is distinguished by God" and/or "He begot an other God". *If you say*, that it does not follow, because to /generate conveys a distinction as *manner* but 'to be distinguished' and/or 'to be another' (conveys a distinction) as a *thing*; *on the contrary*: to . . .

---

[1] Cap. 24: Nam cum dicimus Deum de Deo, Filium de Patre, non alium intelligimus Deum de Deo alio, sed eundem ipsum Deum de eodem ipso Deo. — Codd. cum Vat. falso ponunt *in Prosologio*.
[2] Nam ut ait Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. — De propositione minore Aristot., XIV Metaph. c. 3. (XIII. c. 1.): Alterum (contrarium est) eidem, aliud ipsi (auto). — In hac propositione minore Vat. *et* loco *sed*, obstantibus mss. et ed. 1.

[1] Chapter 24: For when we say "God from God", "Son from the Father", we do not understand one God from an other God, but the same God Itself from the same God Itself. — The codices together with the Vatican edition falsely have *in the Proslogium* [in Prosologio].
[2] For as Aristotle says, <u>On the Soul</u>, Bk. II, text 47 (ch. 4): Moreover nothing itself generates its very self. — On the minor proposition Aristotle, <u>Metaphysics</u>, Bk. XIV, ch. 3 (Bk. XIII, ch. 1), says: "The other" (is the contrary) to "the same", "another" to "this one" (auto). — In this minor proposition the Vatican edition has *and* [et] in place of *but* [sed], contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.

---

p. 100

ad / consequentiam ut *modum* sequitur consecutio ut *res*; unde si haec est vera: si

the consequence [consequentiam] as *manner* there follows the consecution

homo est, animal est,[1] ad hominem sequitur animal. *Et praeterea*, constat quod distinctio generationis non tantum est a parte intelligentis, verum etiam a parte rei: ergo illi distinctioni ut exercitae respondet distinctio realis.

[consecutio] as *thing*; whence if this is true: 'if there is a man, there is an animal',[1] to man there follows animal. *And moreover*, it is established that the distinction of generation is not only on the part of the one understanding, but also on the part of the thing: therefore to that distinction as exercised there responds a real distinction.

2. Item, affirmativa est falsa: Deus genitus est Deus generans; ergo negativa est vera: Deus genitus non est Deus generans. Sed sicut affirmativa significat identitatem, ita negativa diversitatem: ergo sicut Deum generantem et genitum contingit ad invicem comparari mediate negatione, ita mediante alietate: ergo haec est vera: Deus genuit alium Deum.

2. Likewise, the affirmative is false: 'The begotten God is the generating God'; therefore the negative is true: 'The begotten God is not the generating God'. But just as the affirmative signifies an identity, so the negative a diversity: therefore just as it happens that God generating and begotten are compared to one another by means of a negation, so by means of an otherness: therefore this is true: "God begot an other God".

3. Item, Pater sive Deus genuit alium; haec est vera, constat: ergo aut alium Deum, aut alium non Deum; sed non alium non Deum: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, the Father or God begot another; this is true, it is established: therefore either another God, or another not God; but not another not God: ergo etc..

4. Item, *alius* est terminus masculini generis; sed terminus masculini generis[2] stat pro persona in partitivis terminis: ergo *alius* dicit alietatem personalem; sed haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum alium in persona; ergo simpliciter est vera haec: Deus genuit alium Deum.

4. Likewise, *another* [alius] is a term of the masculine genus; but a term of the masculine genus[2] stands for a person among partitive terms: therefore *another* means a personal otherness; but this is true: 'God begot the God other in person'; therefore simply (speaking) this is true: 'God begot another God'.

CONCLUSIO.

In stricto verborum sensu falsa est locutio: Deus genuit alium Deum.

CONCLUSION

In the strict sense of the words, the saying: "God begot an other God", is false.

1. R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod haec consuevit distingui: Deus genuit alium Deum, quia *alius* potest teneri *adiective*; et sic ponit alitatem circa forma istius termini *Deus*, et sic locutio est falsa; potest etiam teneri *substantive*, ut[3] substantivetur; et tunc est appositiva constructio, sicut *animal homo*, et est sensus hoc modo: Deus genuit alium Deum, id est, genuit alium qui est Deus; et in hoc sensu est locutio vera.

1. I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that this (saying): "God begot another God", is accustomed to be distinguished, because *another* can be held *adjectively*; and thus it posits an otherness about the form of that term "*God*", and thus the saying is false; it can also be held *substantively*, to[3] be substantiated [substantivetur]; and then there is an appositive construction, as *the animal 'man'*, and the sense is in this manner: "God begot another God", that is, 'He begot Another who is God"; and in this sense the saying is true.

Sed licet ista distinctio in locutionibus

But though that distinction on account of a

theologicis propter quendam proprium modum loquendi locum habeat, tamen quantum esset de virtute[4] sermonis, non esset distinguenda; quia adiectivum adiunctum substantivo, ut homo albus, non dicitur substantivari, nec appositiva constructio dicitur ibi esse, maxime cum illa sit minus communis respectu magis communis.[5] Unde cum hoc nomen *alius* sit adiectivum habens substantivum coniunctum, in praedicta locutione ponit alietatem circa ipsum ratione suppositi et formae.

certain proper manner of speaking has a place among theological sayings, however as much as it would concern the virtue[4] of the expression [sermonis], it should not be distinguished; because an adjective adjoined to a substantive, as “white man”, is not said to be substantiated, nor is an appositive construction said to be there, most of all when that (construction) is less common in respect of the more common.[5] Whence since this name “*another*” is an adjective having a substantive conjoined, in the aforesaid saying it posits an otherness about it by a reckoning of supposit and of form.

Et propterea, si velimus artificialiter[6] procedere, iudicanda est talis locutio falsa. Propter hoc ad intelligentiam dictae locutionis notanda est regula communis: non habet locum[7] distinctio, ubi non est ex diversis causis unio, verbi gratia, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus uniuntur in hoc nomine *Deus*, non ex diversis causis sive ratione diversorum, sed ratione unius deitatis sive essentiae. Unio ex diversis causis est, ut in *homine* uniuntur Petrus et Ioannes ratione diversarum humanitatum, quia alia est humanitas Petri, et alia Ioannis.

And on that account, if we wish to proceed in an technical manner [artificialiter],[6] such a saying is to be judged false. On account of this, for the understanding of the said saying, a common rule must be noted: ‘distinction[7] has no place, where there is no union out of diverse causes’, for example, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in this name “*God*”, not out of diverse causes or by reason of diverse (things), but by reason of the one Deity or Essence. There is a union out of diverse causes, as (when) in “*man*” there is united Peter and John by reason of diverse humanities, because the one is the humanity of Peter, and the other (that) of John.

Et iuxta hanc regulam ab oppositis[8] est *alia* regula accipienda: non habet locum omnimoda unio, ubi est simul cum unione distinctio, ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus uniuntur in una deitate sive essentia, sed distinctionem habent ratione pluralitatis personarum.

And in accord with this rule, ab opposites,[8] there must be accepted *another* rule: ‘an omnimodal union does not have a place, where there is a distinction together with the union’, as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in one Deity or Essence, but have a distinction by reason of the plurality of the Persons.

Secundum hoc est attendendum, quod in divinis quaedam vocabula importantt distinctionem solum, quaedam omnimodam unionem, quaedam medio modo. Quoniam igitur Deus generans et Deus genitus, etsi sint personaliter distincti, tamen in deitate uniuntur ex eadem causa, quia una deitate: ideo non recipiuntur[9] nomina importantia simpliciter distinctionem. Ideo haec non admittitur: Deus distinguitur a Deo, similiter: Deus genuit alium Deum. *Item*, ratione distinctionis non recipiuntur vocabula omnimodam importantia unionem in supposito et forma; unde haec non

According to this, one must pay attention, that among the divine certain words convey only a distinction, certain ones an omnimodal union, certain ones in a middle manner. Since, therefore, the generating God and the begotten God, even if They are personally distinct, yet they are united in the Deity from the same cause, because (They are) one according to deity: for that reason nouns conveying a simple distinction are not received[9] (in God). For that reason this is not admitted: “God is distinguished from God”, similarly: “God begot another God”. *Likewise*, by reason of the distinction

recipitur: Deus genuit se. Sed illa quae medio modo se habent, recipiuntur, quale est hoc verbum *generat*, quia dicit distinctionem in persona cum[10] unitate essentiae. Similiter haec conceditur: Pater generat alterum se. Unde Augustinus ad Maximinum:[11] « Pater genuit alterum se »; et similiter super Ioannem: « Pater mittens Filium misit alterum se ». Et ex hoc est, quod non sequitur ad generationem verbum simpliciter importans distinctionem; et sic patet primum.

words conveying an omnimodal union in supposit and form are not received; wherefore, this is not received: "God begot Himself". But those which hold themselves in a middle manner, are received, such as is this word "*generates*", because it means a distinction in person with[10] a unity of essence. Similarly this is conceded: "The Father generates the other-Himself [alterum se]". Whence (St.) Augustine (says in his letter) To Maximinus:[11] « The Father begot the other-Himself »; and similarly On John: « The Father sending the Son sent the other-Himself ». And from this it is, that there does not follow after generation a word conveying simply a distinction; and thus the first (objection) is clear.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur de negatione, bene concedo, quod est alietas; sed tamen non sequitur, quod possit dici alietas in *essentia* sive forma deitatis. Unde non sequitur: genitus est alius a generante, ergo[12] alius Deus, quia mutatur suppositio huius termini *Deus*.

2. To that which is objected second concerning negation, I rightly concede, that there is an otherness; but, yet, it does not follow, that there can be meant an otherness in the *essence* or form of the Deity. Whence there does not follow: "the Begotten is other than the One generating, therefore (He is)[12] another God", because the supposition of this term "*God*" is changed.

---

[1] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *etiam*; cod. I autem addit *similiter haec est vera*. Cod. O post *homo est* addit *ergo*. — Plura de hac consequentia vide apud Boeth., de Syllolgismo hypothetico.
[2] Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *qui* loco *sed terminus masculini generis*; et circa finem argumenti *similiter* loco *simpliciter*.
[3] Ed. 1 *sic ut*. Cod R *et si substiantivetur tunc*.
[4] Aliqui codd. ut R cc *veritate*, et paulo infra plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. *iunctum* pro *adiunctum*.
[5] Sensus est: maxime cum appositiva constructio fiad coniunctione termini minus communis cum magis communi.
[6] Hoc est, stricte secundum regulas artium, scilicet grammaticae et logicae.
[7] Codd. cum primis sex edd. omittunt *omnimoda*, quod a Vat. termino *distinctio* praefigitur.
[8] Vat. prater fidem codd. et ed. 1 *opposito*.
[9] Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *recipiuntur* loco *recipiunt*. Paulo infra multi codd. omittunt *similiter*.
[10] Cod. X *distinctionem personarum in*.
[11] Vide in lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine; et super Ioannem, c. 3. Tract 14. n. 11: Pater mittens Filium se alterum misit.
[12] Codd. M X addunt *est*.

---

[1] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the *also* [etiam] added here; codex I moreover adds *similarly this is true* [similiter haec est vera]. Codex O after *there is a man* [homo est] adds *therefore* [ergo]. — See the very many things concerning this consequence in Boethius, On the Hypothetical Syllogism.
[2] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, has the less well *which* [qui] in place of *but a term of the masculine genus* [sed terminus masculini generis]; and near the end of the argument *similarly* [similiter] in place of *simply (speaking)* [simpliciter].
[3] Edition 1 *so that* [sic ut].
[4] Some codices as R and cc have *truth* [veritate], and a little below this very many codices together with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, have *joined* [iunctum] in place of *adjoined* [adiunctum].
[5] The sense is: most of all when an appositive construction is made by a conjunction of a term less common with one more common.
[6] That is, strictly according to the rules of the arts, that is, of grammar and of logic.
[7] The codices together with the first six editions omit *an omnimodal* [omnimoda], to which term the Vatican edition prefixes *distinction* [distinctio].
[8] The Vatican edition not trusting the codices and edition 1 has ab opposito.
[9] Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *they are . . . received* [recipiuntur] in place of *they do . . . receive* [recipiunt]. A little

below this many codices omit *similarly* [similiter].
[10] Codex X has *a distinction of persons in* [distinctionem personarum in].
[11] See the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2, a the end; and On John, ch. 3, tract. 14, n. 11: The Father sending the Son sent Himself-the-other [Pater mittens Filium se alterum].
[12] Codices M and X add *He is* [est].

---

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: aut alium Deum, aut alium non Deum; dico, quod non sufficienter dividit; quia non est contradictio, nisi accipiatur negatio respectu totius. In hac enim: genuit alium Deum, duo dicuntur, scilicet quod *Deus*[1] *Deum*, et quod *alium in deitate*: et ideo ad hoc, quod sumatur contradictio, necesse est, quod feratur supra totum. Unde sicut non valet, demonstrato monacho nigro, qui est albus per naturam: iste aut est albus monaschus, aut albus non monachus, quia utraque falsa; similiter intelligendum est in proposito. Nec valet: est Deus et est alius: ergo est Deus alius, immo est ibi accidens, sicut hic: est bonus et est citharoedus: ergo est bonus citharoedus.[2]

3. To that which is objected third: either another God, or another not God; I say, that (this) does not sufficiently divide (the matter); because there is no contradiction, unless there is accepted a negation in respect of the whole. For in this (saying): "He begot another God", two (things) are said, that is, that *God* (begot)[1] a *God*, and that (He has begot) an *other in deity*: and for that reason, for this, that a contradiction be obtained [sumatur], it is necessary, that it be brought upon the whole. Whence just as it is not valid, that having demonstrated that 'black is the monk, who is white by nature', (to say): "that one is either a white monk, or a white non-monk", because each (is) false; similarly it must be understood in the proposed. Nor is it valid (to say): "There is a God and there is an Other: therefore there is another God", nay there is (a fallacy of) the accident there, as here: "There is a good (man) and there is a kitara-player [citharoedus]: therefore there is a good kitara-player".[2]

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod *alius*, quamvis sit masculini generis, tamen quia ponit rem circa substantivum,[3] ab illo trahit suppositionem; et ideo non tenetur personaliter, nisi secundum quod substantivatur, sicut et hoc nomen unus; unde sicut si dicatur *unus Deus*, *unus* dicit unitatem substantialem, ita si dicatur alius Deus, *alius* dicit alietatem substantialem. Et ratio huius venit non tantum, quia *adiectivum*, sed quia *generale*, quod specificatur per adiunctum.

4. That which is objected last, it must be said, that *another* [alius], although it belong to the masculine genus, however because it posits a thing about a substantive,[3] it draws away from it a supposition; and for that reason it is not held personally, except according to which it is substantiated, just as also this name "one" (is); whence just as if there were said "*one God*", "*one*" means a substantial unity, so if there were said "another God", "*another*" means a substantial otherness. And the reason for this comes not only, because (it is) an *adjective*, but because (it is) a *general* one, which is specified through (its) adjunct.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Distinctionem in principio responsionis positam, quod *alius* hic possit teneri vel adiective vel substantive (nempe ut appositio), S. Doctor improbat, cum sit regula grammaticorum, quod adiectivum, si immediate sibi coniunctum habet substantivum, non potest accipi ut substantivum sive ut appositio. Si autem *alius* est adiectivum, tunc valet regula logicae, quod *alius*, quando immediate ad suum subiectivum ponitur, importat «alietatem » circa suum substantivum tum ratione suppositi, tum ratione formae. Consequenter in casu nostro hic terminus importaret diversitatem in Deitate.

I. The distinction posited at the beginning of the response, that "*another*" [alius] here can be held as an adjective and/or a substantive (namely as an apposite), the Seraphic Doctor disproves, since there is a rule of grammarians, that an adjective, if it has a substantive immediately conjoined with itself, cannot be accepted as a substantive or as an apposite. If moreover "*another*" is an adjective, then is valid the rule of logic, that "*another*", when it is placed immediately adjacent [ad] to its substantive, conveys an « otherness » about its substantive both by a reckoning of a supposit, and by a reckoning of form. Consequently in our case this term would introduce a diversity in the Deity.

II. In conclusione et solutione obiectorum principales doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. q. 31. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

II. n the conclusion and solution of the objections the principle doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1. — St. Thomas, here in a. 3; Summa., I, q. 31, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 2.

---

[1] Cod. R addit *genuit*.
[2] Exemplum sumtum est ex Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11), ubi secundum translationem Boethii habetur *si citharoedus est et bonus, est et citharoedus bonus*, licet aliae translationes ponunt *coriarius* (sxuteus) pro *citharoedus*. — De hac fallacia accidentis vide supra d. 2. q. 4. ad 1.
[3] Vat. hic *subiectum* loco *substantivum*, et paulo infra post *substantivatur* ponit *Sicut ergo, cum dicitur unus Deus, hoc nomen unus dicit unitatem*, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.

[1] Codex R adds *begot*.
[2] The example taken from Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 2 (ch. 11), where according to the translation of Boethius there is had *if the kitara-player is also good, he is also a good kitara-player* [si citharoedus est bonus, est et citharoedus bonus], though other translations have a tanner [coriarius] (sxuteus) in place of *kitara-player* [citharoedus]. — Concerning this fallacy of the accident see above d. 2, q. 4, at n. 1.
[3] Here the Vatican edition has *subject* [subiectum] in place of *substantive* [substantivum], and a little below this after *is substantiated* [substantivatur] it puts *Therefore just as, when there is said "one God", this name "one" means a unity* [Sicut ergo, cum dicictur unus Deus, hoc nomen unus dicit unitatem], but contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 101-102.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum congrue iuxta regulas grammaticae dici possit: plures dii.

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum hoc nomen *Deus* grammatice significet pluralem numerum, sive utrum congrue possit dici: *plures dii*. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia secundum Philosophum[4] intellectus sunt idem apud omnes, quamvis voces sint diversae; sed modi significandi consequuntur modos intelligendi: ergo cum apud Hebraeos congrue dicatur *Heloim*, quod aequipollet ei quod est *dii*, ergo et apud nos.

2. Item, sicut vult Philosophus,[5] verum supponit congruum; unde « Catonis est, velit [vult], non est, nec verum nec falsum significat »; sed haec vera est: non sunt plures dii: ergo congrua: ergo et haec congrua: plures sunt dii, quia negatio non removet incongruitatem.

3. Item, sicut Deus convenit uni soli, ita principium[6] creaturarum uni soli; sed

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

ARTICLE I

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 101-102.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 3

Whether congruously in accord with the rules of grammar there can be said: "many gods"

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether this name "*God*" grammatically signifies a plural number, or whether congruously there can be said: "*many gods"* [plures dii]. And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Because according to the Philosopher[4] the understandings (of words) are the same among all, although (their) sounds [voces] are diverse; but manners of signifying are consequent to manners of understanding: therefore when among the Hebrews there is congruously said *Eloim*, which is equivalent to that (word) which (in our tongue) is "*Gods*", therefore also among us.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher would have [vult],[5] the true supposes the congruous; whence « 'It belongs to Cato, and/or it does not belong', signifies neither the true nor the false »; but this is true: 'there are not many gods': therefore (so is) the congruous (equivalent): therefore also this congruous (equivalent): 'there are many gods', because negation does not remove the incongruity.

3. Likewise, as "God" convenes with One alone, thus "the principle[6] of creatures"

quamvis falso dicantur plura principia, tamen dicuntur congrue: ergo pari ratione possumus dicere: plures dii.

(with) One alone; but although falsely there are said (to be) many principles, yet congruously they are said (to be): therefore by an equal reason we can say: “many gods”.

4. Item, hoc nomen *phoenix* non habet nisi unicum suppositum;[7] tamen congrue dicitur: plures phoenices. *Si tu dicas*, quod suppositum plurificatur per successionem temporis; obiicio tibi de hoc nomine *sol*, quod nullo tempore plurificatur; et tamen congrue dicitur: plures soles: ergo et plures dii.

4. Likewise, this name *phoenix* has naught but one supposit;[7] however there is congruously said: “more phoenixes”. *If you say*, that the supposit is plurified through a succession of time; I object to you concerning this name “S*un*”, which at no time is plurified; and, however, there is congruously said: “many suns”: therefore also “many gods”.

Contra: 1. Omne nomen, quod habet plurale, est nomen appellativum; propria enim nomina non plurificantur, non enim dicitur: plures Petri vel Ioannes;[8] sed hoc nomen *Deus* non est nomen applellativum, quia non significat formam multiplicabilem: ergo etc.
2. Item, hoc nomen *Deus* est proprie[9] proprium divinae naturae; sed nullum tale multiplicatur: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. Every noun [nomen], which has a plural, is an appellative noun; for proper nouns are not plurified, for there is not said: “many Peters and/or Johns”;[8] but this noun “*God*” is not an appellative noun, because it does not signify a multipliable form: ergo etc..
2. Likewise, this noun “*God*” is properly (speaking)[9] proper to the Divine Nature; but nothing such is multiplied: ergo etc..

---

[4] Libr. I. Periherm. c. 1: Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem sunt, ita nec voces omnibus eaedem: quorum tamen haec signa primo sunt, ea omnibus sunt eaedem passiones animae.
[5] Libr. I. Periherm. c. 2, iuxta translationem Boethii: « Nomen vero semper, ut Catonis est, vel non est; nondum enim aliquid verum dicit aut falsum »; in quo textu ceterae translationes *Philosnis* pro *Catonis* ponunt. Ad quem locum auctor libri Auctoritatum Aristot. etc. (a. 1500) addit: « Ex quo communiter tahitur, quod verum et falsum praesupponunt congruum ». Incongruitas huius dictionis consistit in *discohaerentia accidentium*, ut infra in solutione dicitur; dees enim subiectum genitivi.
[6] Cod. S addit *omnium*. Codd. cum ed. 1 in fine argumenti *deos* loco *dii*.
[7] S. Doctor loquitur secundum anitquam opinionem fabulosam, quod haec avis in uno solo individuo existat, ex cuius cinveribus resurgat alius. Item exemplum adducit Boeth., I. de Categoriis Aristot. c. de Denominativis.
[8] Cfr. Priscian., II. Grammat. c. 5.
[9] Postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus *proprie*. Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut H ff post *mulitiplicatur* adiiciunt *vel plurificatur*; ed. 1 *nec plurificatur*.

[4] On Interpretation, Bk. 1, ch. 1: And in accord with the manner that letters are neither the same for all (peoples), so also are spoken words [voces] not the same for all (men): to whom, however, these signs (i. e. letters) belong first, because of this [ea] the passions of the soul are the same for all.
[5] On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 2, according to the translation of Boethius: « However, “It is always the name of Cato, and/or it is not”; for it does not yet say anything true or false »; in which text the rest of the translations put *to Philo* [Philonis] in place of *to Cato* [Catonis]. Regarding which passage the author of the book Auctoritatum Aristotelis etc. (1500 A. D.) adds: « From which there is commonly drawn, that the true and the false presuppose the congruous ». The incongruity of this saying consists in a *discoherence of accidents*, as is said below in the solution; for the subject of the genitive is lacking.
[6] Codex S adds *of all* [omnium]. The codices together with edition 1 at the end of the argument have *that (there are) many gods* [plures deos] in place of *many gods* [plures dii].
[7] The Seraphic Doctor speaks of the fabulous opinion of the ancients, that this bird exists in only one individual, from whose ashes there arises another. Boethius adduces the same example, On the Categories of Aristotle, Bk. I, ch. "On Denominatives".
[8] Cf. Priscian, Grammar, Bk. II, ch. 5.
[9] Having examined the manuscripts and edition 1, we have added *properly (speaking)* [proprie]. A little below this some codices as H and ff after *is multiplied* [multiplicatur] add *and/or plurified* [vel plurificatur]; edition 1 has *nor is it plurified* [nec

plurificatur].

p. 102

CONCLUSIO.

Nomen Deus*, proprie loquendo, non habet plurale.*

CONCLUSION

The noun "God", properly speaking, does not have a plural.

R**ESPONDEO**: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hoc nomen *Deus* dicitur tripliciter, scilicet *nuncupative*, *adoptive* et *naturaliter*. Primis duobus modis plurificatur; unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios octavo:[1] *Si quidem sunt dii multi, et domini multi*; sed tertio modo non, quia sic hoc nomen *Deus* significat divinam naturam cum conditionibus, quarum collectiones impossibile est in alio reperire; et ideo sicut nomen proprium non habet plurale, secundum artem loquendo, sic nec hoc[2] nomen Deus.

I **RESPOND**: For an understanding of the aforesaid there must be noted, that this noun "*God*" is said in a threefold manner, that is *as a name* [nuncupative], *adoptively* and *naturally*. In the first two manners it is plurified; whence the Apostle in the eight (chapter) of the First (Letter) to the Corinthians (says):[1] *If indeed there are many gods, and many lords*; but in the third manner not (so), because as this noun "*God*" signifies the Divine Nature with (its) conditions, the collection of which is impossible to be discovered in an other; and for that reason just as a proper noun does not have a plural, according to the art of speaking [artem loquendo], so neither this[2] noun "God".

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod apud Hebraeos habet plurale quod est *Heloim*; dicendum, quod modi significandi non tantum sequuntur[3] diversos modos intelligendi generales, sed etiam modos exprimendi. Et quoniam ipsi habent articulos et modos exprimendi diversos, quos nos non habemus, ideo illi possunt habere, sed nos non.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that among the Hebrews there is had a plural which is *Eloim*; it must be said that manners of signifying do not only follow[3] diverse, general manners of understanding, but also manners of expressing. And since they have articles and diverse manners of expressing, which we do not have (in Latin), for that reason they can have (the plural), but we (can) not.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verum supponit congruum; dicendum, quod duplex est incongruitas: *una* est ex discohaerentia accidentium,[4] ut *Catonis est*; *alia* ex discohaerentia intellectuum, ut cum dicitur: *plures Petri*. Prima incongruitas tollit veritatem et falsitatem; secunda vero incongruitas habet falsitatem coniunctam: et ideo, quia per negationem removetur falsitas, et Sancti malunt loqui vere, quam proprietatem sermonis servare et loqui minus vere, ideo negant plures deos. Posset[5] tamen dici, quod quamvis haec vox *dii* non sit vox significativa secundum artem et impositionem, tamen est vox significativa ex accommodatione usus, ut *olli* pro *illi*: et ideo generat falsum intellectum affirmativa,

2. To that which is objected, that the true supposes the congruous; it must be said, that there is a twofold incongruity: *one* is from a discoherence of accidents,[4] as "*It belongs to Cato*"; the *other* is from a discoherence of understandings, as when there is said: "*many Peters*". The first incongruity takes away truth and falsity; however the second incongruity has a falsity conjoined: and for that reason, because through a negation falsity is removed, and the Saints preferred to speak in a true manner, (rather) than observe the propriety of speech and speak less truly, for that reason they denied that (there are) many gods. It could,[5] however, be said, that although this sound [vox] "*gods*" is not

et negativa verum, quamvis non grammatice.

a significative sound according to the art (of speaking) and (its) imposition, however it is a significative sound from an accommodation of use, as "*those*" [olli] for "*those*" [illi]: and for that reason an affirmative generates a false understanding, and a negative a true one, although not grammatically.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principium uni soli convenit, similiter et pheonix; dicendum, quod convenire uni soli est tripliciter. Aut enim est, quia imponitur nomen a forma *immultiplicablili*, ut in propriis nominibus; et sic tollit pluralitatem *re* et *consignificatione*. Aut imponitur a forma, quae *nata est* communicari, quamvis non *communicetur propter determinationem*, ut cum[6] dicitur: principium creaturarum. Aut propter *defectum materiae*, ut phoenix; et tale tollit pluralitatem *secundum rem* non *secundum consignificationem*, quia potest consignificari talis forma, ut potest multiplicari per supposita.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that a principle convenes with one alone, similarly also the phoenix; it must be said, that to convene with one alone is (said) in a threefold manner. For either it is, because a noun is imposed by a non-multipliable form, as in proper nouns; and thus it takes away plurality in *thing* and in *consignification*. Or it is imposed by a form, which is *bound to* be communicated, although it is not *communicated on account of a determination*, as when[6] there is said: "the principle of creatures". Or on account of a *defect of matter*, as the phoenix; and such takes away a plurality *according to thing*, not *according to consignification*, because such a form can be consignified, as it can be multiplied through supposits.

SCHOLION.

I. Non est hic quaestio de illo fundamentali dogmate, quod Deus sit unus (quod probatum est supra, d. 2. q. 1), sed de hoc: utrum nomen *Deus* ratione trium personarum possit pluraliter inflecti. De hoc argumento S. Doctor bis disputat, scil. hic quoad *modum dicendi*; infra vero, d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. iterum quoad *rem* sive veritatem interisecam. Quaestio hic discussa, quae spectat potius ad grammaticam, inde orta videtur, quod apud Hebraeos in voce Heloim pluralis adhibetur (cfr. 1. arg. ad oppositum). Hoc explicandum esse ex propria indole Hebraicae linguae asserit S. Bonav., cui consentit S. Thom. S. I. q. 39. a. 3. ad 2.

II. Idem docent: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 2; sed triplicem distinctionem hic in corp. positam habet ibid. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 9. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 22. — Petrus a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. —

SCHOLIUM

I. The question here does not concern the fundamental dogma, that God is one (which has been proved above, in d. 2, q. 1), but rather this: whether the noun "*God*" [Deus] by reason of the Three Persons can be inflected in the plural. Concerning this argument the Seraphic Doctor twice disputes, that is here in regard to the *manner of speaking*; again below, in d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 in regard to the *thing* or intrinsic truth. The question discussed here, which regards rather grammar, from which it seems to have arisen, that among the Hebrews in the sound "Eloim" a plural is employed (cf. 1 argument to the opposite). That this must be explained from the proper inherent quality [indole] of the Hebraic tongue St. Bonaventure so asserts, to which St. Thomas, Summa., I. q. 39, q. 3, at n. 2, consents.

II. (The following) teach the same (opinion): Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I. q. 50, m. 2; but the triple distinction posited here in the body (of the question) is had in m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2, at n.

Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. q. 2. n. 28.

[1] Vers. 5.
[2] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte *sic nec nomen Dei*.
[3] Ex plurimis mss. ut A C F G H M N R S T V X Y Z etc. substituimus *sequuntur* loco *requirunt*; alii codd. ut I U ff cum ed. 1 *consequuntur*. Lectio mss. certe praeferenda lectioni Vat. Paulo infra Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. et ed. 1 *quoniam ergo* pro *Et quoniam*. Demum circa finem argumenti, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, ponit Vat. *dicere* loco *habere*; in lectione mss. supple: plurale.
[4] Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 1. (de Constructione): Nam si incongrua (ratio contextus) sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus, quo modo inconcinnitas litterarum vel syllabarum vel eis accidentium in singulis dictionibus facit barbarismum. — Vat. sola *adiacentium* loco *accidentium*, quae et paulo supra contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 habet *praesupponit* pro *supponit*.
[5] Vat. *potest*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1. Circa finem huius responsionis aliqui codd. ut A C L O R S V Y *ex intellectu* pro *intellectum*.
[6] Supplevimus ex mss. et primis sex edd. *cum*. In fine responsionis antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 *significari* pro *consignificari*, et cod. Q (in margine) *potens* loco *potest*.

3; Summa., I, q. 13, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 4, q. 2, n. 28.

[1] Verse 5.
[2] The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has less aptly *so neither the name of God* [sic nec nomen Dei].
[3] From very many manuscripts as A C G G J M N R S T V X Y Z etc. we have substituted *follow* [sequuntur] in place of *require* [requirunt]; other codices as I U ff together with edition 1 have *follow after* [consequuntur]. The reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be preferred to the reading of the Vatican text. A little below this the Vatican text contrary to very many codices as A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. and edition 1 has *therefore since* [quoniam ergo] in place of *And since* [Et quoniam]. Finally near the end of the argument, by disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text puts *say* [dicere] in place of *have* [habere]; in reading the manuscripts supple: plural.
[4] Priscian, Grammar, Bk. XVII, ch. 1 (On Construction): For if (the reason for the context) is incongruous, it will cause a solecism, as if by an awkward concourse of the elements of discourse [quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus], in the manner that the awkwardness of letters and/or of syllables and/or of the accidents in their individual pronunciation [singulis dictionibus] cause a barbarism. — The Vatican text alone has *adjacents* [adiacentium] in place of *accidents* [accidentium], which text also a little above this, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, has *presupposes* [praesupponit] in place of *supposes* [supponit].
[5] The Vatican text has *it can*, but the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this. Near the end of this response some codices as A C L O R S V Y have *from the understanding* [ex intellectu] in place of *understanding* [intellectum].
[6] We have supplied from the manuscripts and the first six editions *when* [cum]. At the end of the response the more ancient codices together with edition 1 have *be signified* [significari] in place of *be consignified* [consignificari], and codex Q (in the margin) has *able* [potens] in place of *can* [potest].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in

Commentaries on

Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio IV.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 102-103.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum hoc nomen Deus pro persona supponat, vel pro natura.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur de suppositione huius nominis *Deus*. Et quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *Deus* de se supponat personam, vel naturam. Et quod personam, videtur.

1. Per illud Ambrosii super: *Benedicat nos Deus, Deus noster, benedicat nos Deus*.[7] Ambrosius: « Trina Dei confessio Trinitatem indicat personarum », ergo cum Deus sit ibi sine adiuncto, de se supponit personam.

2. Item, *ratione* obiicitur sic: Hoc nomen *homo* proprie[8] supponit pro omni eo, cui inest humanitas: ergo a simili et hoc nomen *Deus* pro omni / eo, cui inest Deitas; . . .

---

[7] Psalm. 66, 7. 8. — Verba, quae hic a S. Doctore attribuuntur S. Ambrosio, eidem etiam a Magistro supra d. II. c. 4. adscribuntur. Vide p. 48. nota 8. — In ipsis verbis Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *professio* loco *confessio*.

[8] Ex mss. ed. 1 *ostenditur* pro *obiicitur*. Mox post *Deus* Vat. contra codd. repetit *supponit*.

the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

ARTICLE I

Question 4

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 102-103.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 4

Whether this name "God" supposes for a person, and/or for a nature.

FOURTH AND LAST there is asked concerning the supposition of this name *God*. And it is asked, whether this name "*God*" of itself supposes a person, and/or a nature. And it seems, that (it does suppose) a person.

1. By that (word) of (St.) Ambrose on (the verse): *May He bless us, God, Our God, may He bless us God*.[7] Ambrose (says): « The triune confession of God indicates the Trinity of Persons », therefore since "God" is there without adjunct, it of itself [de se] supposes a person.

2. Likewise, by *reason* it is thus objected: This noun "*man*" properly (speaking)[8] supposes on behalf of every one, in whom there is humanity: therefore by a similar (reason) this noun "*God*" also (supposes) on behalf of every / one, in whom the Deity is; . . .

---

[7] Psalm 66: 7, 8. — The words, which are here by the Seraphic Doctor attributed to St. Ambrose, are also ascribed by Master (Peter) above in d. 2, ch. 4, to the same (author). See p. 48, note 8 (of the present volume). — Within these words the Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has *profession* [professio] in place of *confession* [confessio].

[8] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *properly (speaking)* [proprie]. A little before this very many codices together with edition 1 have

shown [ostenditur] in place of *objected* [obiicitur]. Then after *God* the Vatican edition repeats *supposes* [supponit], contrary to the codices.

eo, cui inest Deitas; sed hoc est persona: ergo etc.

one, in whom the Deity is; but this is a Person: ergo etc..

3. Item, hoc nomen *Deus* significat deitatem in concretione; sed non nisi in concretione ad suppositum, quod est persona; sed terminus concretus proprie supponit pro eo, respectu cuius importat formam, ut album magis proprie supponit pro re alba quam pro forma: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, this noun *God* signifies deity in concretion; but (it signifies) naught unless in concretion towards a supposit, which is a Person; but a concrete term properly supposes on behalf of that, in respect of which it introduces a form, as “a white” [album] properly supposes on behalf of a white thing rather than on behalf of a form: ergo etc..

Sed contra: 1. Pronomen refert rem pro proprio supposito;[1] sed cum dicitur: *Benedicat nos Deus, et metuant eum*, hoc pronomen *eum* refert naturam, non personam: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. A pronoun refers to a thing on behalf of its own supposit;[1] but when there is said: *May He bless us, God, and let them fear Him*, this pronoun “*Him*” refers to the Nature, not to a Person: ergo etc..

2. Item, quia iste terminus *homo* proprie supponit pro individuo, ista est falsa: homo est Socrates et Plato, quia idem individuum non recipit illam praedicationem; sed haec est vera: Deus est Trinitas, vel: Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo cum illud praedicatum non conveniat uni personae, patet etc.

2. Likewise, because that term “*man*” properly supposes on behalf of an individual, that (saying) of his is false: “man is Socrates and Plato”, because the same individual does not receive that predication; but this is true: “God is the Trinity”, and/or: “God is the Father and the Son”: therefore since that predicate does not convene upon one Person, it is clear that etc..

3. Item, terminus, qui proprie supponit personam, addito sibi termino partitivo, stat solum pro uno, ut cum dicitur: unus homo currit: ergo similiter, cum dicitur *unus Deus*: ergo haec est simpliciter falsa: unus Deus est Pater et Filius.

3. Likewise, a term, which properly supposes a person, having a partitive term added to it, stands solely for one, as when there is said: “one man runs”: therefore similarly, when there is said “*one God”*: therefore this is simply false: “one God is the Father and the Son”.

CONCLUSIO.

Nomen Deus, cum habeat naturam et termini communis et termini singularis, potest proprie supponere tam pro natura quam pro persona.

CONCLUSION

The noun "God", since it has the nature both of a common term and a singular term, can properly suppose both on behalf of a Nature as on behalf of a Person.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod hic consuevit esse duplex opinio.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that here there is accustomed to be a twofold opinion.

Una quidem est, quod hoc nomen *Deus* significat proprie naturam et supponit personam, aliquando unam, ut cum dicitur: Deus spirat, aliquando tres, ut cum dicitur: Deus est Trinitas. Et ratio huius est, ut dicunt, quia cum habeat multa supposita, habet naturam termini communis; terminus autem communis proprie supponit pro individuo, pro natura vero vel pro forma non supponit proprie,[2] nisi trahatur, ut si dicatur: homo est species. Sic dicunt in proposito. Ulterius dicunt, quod quia supposita omnia sunt in illo unica[3] suppositione, ideo simul potest supponere pro multis personis, licet illud non possit iste terminus *homo*, vel alius terminus communis; et sic solvunt obiecta.

One indeed is, that this noun "*God*" signifies properly a nature and supposes a person, sometimes one, as when there is said: "God breathes", sometimes three, as when there is said: "God is the Trinity". And the reason for this is, as they say, that since ("God") has many supposits, it has the nature of a common term; moreover a common term properly supposes on behalf of an individual, however on behalf of a nature and/or a form it does not suppose properly,[2] unless it be (logically) extended [trahatur], as if there is said: "man is a species". In this manner they speak in the proposed (objection). Furthermore they say, that because all (the Persons) have been supposed in that (term) by a unique[3] supposition, for that reason it can simultaneously suppose on behalf of many Persons, though that term *man*, and/or an other common term could not (do) that; and thus they solve the objections.

Alia opinio est, quod proprie supponit naturam, sicut significat, et non supponit personam, nisi trahatur ab alio, ut cum dicitur: Deus generat; et hi dicunt, quod cum dicitur: Deus est Trinitas, ibi stat pro natura, non pro persona; et[4] una natura est tres personae: ideo vera est locutio. Et ratio huius positionis est, quia hoc nomen *Deus* habet naturam termini discreti, cum non habeat plurale; ideo idem significat et supponit proprie; cum ergo significet naturam, illam proprie supponit.

An *other* opinion is, that it properly supposes a nature, just as it signifies, and does not suppose a person, unless it be (logically) extended by an other, as when there is said: "God generates"; and these say, that when there is said: "God is the Trinity", it stands there for the Nature, not for a Person; and[4] "the one Nature is the Three Persons": for that reason the saying is true. And the reason for this position is, that this noun "*God*" has the nature of a discrete term, since it does not have a plural; for that reason it signifies and properly supposes the same (thing); therefore since it signifies a nature, it properly supposes that.

Sed melius est dicere *utrumque* — quia habet naturam termini *communis* et termini *discreti*: termini *communis* propter pluralitatem suppositorum, termini *discreti* ratione formae immultiplicabilis — quod[5] proprie supponit tam naturam quam personam. Tamen rationes ad utramque partem concludunt verum suo modo. Hoc autem non potest in alio termino invenire, et ideo nec consimilis modus supponendi.

But it is better to say (that it supposes) *each* — because it has the nature of a *common* term and of a *discrete* term: of a *common* term on account of a plurality of supposits, of a *discrete* term by reason of an non-multipliable form — that[5] it properly supposes as much a Nature as a Person. However the reasons for each part conclude truly in their own manner. Moreover this (use) cannot be found in any other term, and for that reason neither (can there be found) a exactly similar [consimilis] manner of supposing.

SCHOLION.

I. De differentia inter significationem et suppositionem cfr. Scholion hic ad q. 1. Terminus *discretus*, de quo loquitur S. Bonav., idem est ac terminus *singularis* et significat aliquod incommunicabile. Unde « terminus singularis idem significat et supponit »(S. Thom. S. I. q. 39. a. 4.). Terminus vero *communis* non oportet semper supponere pro eo quod per se significat, v. g. in propositione: homo currit, non supponit *homo* pro natura communi humana, sed pro aliquo indeterminato individuo.

II. Licet antiqui doctores de hac questione diversis modis loquantur, in re tamen parum dissentire videtur. S. Bonav. praefert tertiam sententiam, quae mediam viam tenet, scil. quod Deus proprie supponat tum pro natura tum pro persona. S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) sententiam primo loco positam docere videtur, secundam vero ibi et in Summa penitus reiicit. Illam vero primam opinionem in Summa (I. q. 39. a. 4.) ita explicat, ut cum tertia et media sententia S. Bonaventurae conveniat. Hoc patet, si sententia S. Bonaventurae distinctis propositionibus proponitur. Propositio 1: Nomini *Deus* convenit haec proprietas, ut partim sit terminus communis, partim singularis. Ratio est, quia significat simul tum formam *non multiplicabilem*, tum naturam *communicabilem*. Idem docet S. Thom. (S. loc. cit. ad. 2.). Propositio 2: Hinc est, quod *Deus* aliquando supponit pro natura, aliquando pro persona. Hoc idem asserunt S. Thom. et Alex. Hal.; tamen Angelicus addit, quod « *per se* supponit pro natura communi » (ad 3.), sed « ex *modo significandi* » habet, ut proprie possit supponere pro persona (in corp.).

III. Circa ipsam quaestionem cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., locis citt. — Scot., hic q. 2. in fine. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 6 et d. 32. a. 8. 2.

SCHOLIUM

I. Concerning the difference between signification and supposition cf. Scholium here at q. 1. The *discrete* term, of which St. Bonaventure speaks, is the same as the *singular* term and it signifies something incommunicable. Whence « a singular term signifies and supposes the same (thing) » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4). However a *common* term is not required [non oportet] to suppose on behalf of that which it signifies per se, v. q. in the proposition: “a man runs”, “*man*” does not suppose on behalf of the common human nature, but on behalf of some indeterminate individual.

II. Though the ancient doctors speak of this question in diverse manners, however they seem to dissent very little in the matter. St. Bonaventure prefers the third sentence, which holds a middle way, that is that “God” properly supposes as much for a Nature as for a Person. St. Thomas in his Commentary (here at q. 1, a. 2) seems to teach the sentence posited in the first place, however he rejects the second one completely there and in the Summa. However he so explains that first opinion in the Summa (I, q. 39, a. 4), that it agrees with the third and middle-sentence of St. Bonaventure. This is clear, if the sentence of St. Bonaventure is proposed in distinct propositions. Proposition 1: ‘To the noun “*God*” there convenes this property, that it is partly a common term, partly a singular one. The reason is, that it signifies simultaneously as much a *non multipliable* form, as a *communicable* nature’. St. Thomas teaches the same (Summa., loc. cit., at n. 2). Proposition 2: ‘Hence it is, that “*God*” sometimes supposes on behalf of a nature, other times for a person’. St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales assert this same (teaching); however the Angelic (Doctor) adds, that « *per se* it supposes on behalf of the common nature » (at n. 3), but « from *a manner of signifying* » it has the ability [habet ut possit] to properly suppose on behalf of a person (cf. in the body of the question).

III. About the question itself cf. St. Bonaventure, below in d. 29, a. 1, q. 2; Sent., Bk. III, d. 7, a. 1, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, locis citt.. — (Bl. John

— Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 40. — Dionys. Carth., hic a. 2. in princ. — Biel, hic q. 2.

Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2 at the end. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnuus), here in a. 5 and 6 and d. 32, a. 8. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 54, q. 3, n. 40. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in a. 2 in princ. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.

[1] Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 2: Substantiam enim significat loco nominis positum pronomen et personam verbo sibi adiuncto congruam indicat.
[2] Vat. hic omittit *proprie* et paulo post habet *dicamus* loco *dicatur*, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
[3] Plerique codd. ut A C F G I K L O R X Z *una*. Pauloo infra Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1. *solverunt*, aliqui tamen codd. ut K P Q X legunt *solvuntur*.
[4] Cod. H addit *quia*.
[5] Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed 1, in quorum lectione *quod* refertur ad paulo supra positum *dicere utrumque*. Vat. loco *quod* ponit *ideo*, cuius lectionis sensus explicatur codice Z *et ideo dico quod proprie*. Paulo infra codd. O bb *Unde* pro *Tamen*.

[1] Priscian, Grammar, Bk. XVII, ch. 2: For a pronoun put in the place of a noun signifies a substance and it indicates a congruous person with a word adjoined to it.
[2] The Vatican edition here omits *properly* [proprie] and a little after this it has *we say* [dicamus] in place of *there is said* [dicatur], but the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this.
[3] Very many codices as A C F G I K L O R X Z have *one* [una]. A little below this the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *they solved* [solverunt], however the other codices as K P Q X read *there are solved* [solvuntur].
[4] Codex H adds *because* [quia].
[5] Thus nearly all the codices together with edition 1, in which reading *that* [quod] is referred to what is posited a little above this *to say (that it supposes) each* [dicere utrumque]. The Vatican edition in place of *because* [quod] puts *for that reason* [ideo], the sense of which reading is explained by codex Z *and for that reason I say that properly* [et ideo dico quod proprie]. A little below this codices O and bb have *Whence* [Unde] in place of *However* [Tamen].

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 104-106.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

DUB. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine*; quia cum praepositio *de* notet transitionem et ita diversitatem et[1] distinctionem, videtur quod pari ratione et ab aequipollenti istae sunt verae: Deus est alius a Deo, Deus distinguitur a Deo.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est importare distinctionem sive diversitatem, scilicet ut *modum*[2] vel ut *rem*, vel ut *excercitam* vel ut *conceptam*. Quoniam igitur praepositiones important distinctionem ut *exercitam*, et distinctio est in divinis quantum ad supposita, *de*[3] facit terminum stare pro diversis suppositis. Quoniam ergo circa id ponit modum, circa quod exercet distinctionem, et tales sunt personae: ideo est vera locutio. Quia vero hoc nomen *alius* importat distinctionem ut *conceptam*, similiter hoc verbum *distinguere*: ideo simpliciter ponit distinctionem circa terminum ratione suae formae; ideo sunt falsa.[4]

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de responsione, quam ponit Magister, ibi: *Quod vero additur: Ergo genuit se Deum* etc., quia Magister solvit interimendo conclusionem et videtur non recte solvere. Cum enim *idem* et *diversum* sufficienter dividant ens,[5] videtur necessario sequi: genuit Deum: ergo se, vel alium.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Magister sustinendo primam et interimendo

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 104-106.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

DOUBT I

About the text in this part is asked of this which (the Nicene Creed) says: *God from God, Light from Light*; because since the preposition "*from*" [de] notes transition and thus diversity and[1] distinction, it seems that for an equal reason and from it being equivalent [ab aequipollenti] these are also true: 'There is another God than God', 'God is distinguished from God'.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that to introduce distinction or diversity is twofold, that is, as a *manner* (of being regarded)[2] and/or as a *thing*, and/or as (something) *exercised* and/or as *conceived*. Therefore since prepositions introduce distinction as (something) *exercised*, and distinction is among the divine as much as regards the Supposits, "*from*"[3] causes a term to stand for diverse Supposits. Therefore since it places a manner (of being regarded) about that, about which it exercises a distinction, and such are the Persons: for that reason it is a true saying. However because this noun "*another*" introduces a distinction as (something) *conceived*, similarly this verb "*to distinguish*": for that reason it simply posits a distinction about the term by reason of its form; for that reason (these sayings) are false.

DOUBT II

Likewise is asked concerning the response, which Master (Peter) puts, there: *However because there is added: therefore He begot Himself God* etc., because Master (Peter) solves the conclusion by interemption and he seems not to solve it rightly. For since '*the same*' and '*the diverse*' sufficiently divide a being [ens],[5] it seems that necessarily there follows: 'He begot God: therefore Himself, and/or another'.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that Master (Peter) by sustaining the first and by

conclusionem innuit, conclusionem non sequi ex praemissis; et quod non sequatur, ostendit ferendo instantiam[6] contra illud disiunctum.

denying [interimendo] the conclusion hints, that the conclusion does not follow from the premises; and that it does not follow, he shows by bringing forward [ferendo] an instance[6] against that disjunction [disiunctum].

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod *idem* et *diversum* sufficienter dividunt[7] ens; dicendum, quod simpliciter loquendo falsum est. Nam pars nec est eadem toti omnino nec simpliciter diversa. Habet tamen veritatem secundum *idem*. Unde: « si non est idem alii, est diversum », verum est secundum illud, secundum quod non est idem.[8] Filius autem non est idem Patri in persona, et ideo in persona alius; nec tamen sequitur: *alius Deus*, quia significatur alietas in essentia.[9]

However to that which is objected, that '*the same*' and '*the diverse*' sufficiently divide[7] being [ens]; it must be said, that simply speaking it is false. For a part is neither entirely the same as the whole nor simply diverse. It has, however, truth according to which (it is) *the same*. Whence: « if it is not the same as the other, it is diverse », is true according to that (principle), according to which it is not the same.[8] Moreover the Son is not the same as the Father in person, and for that reason in person (He is) Another; nor does there, however, follow: '(He is) *another God'*, because (in this) there is signified otherness in essence.[9]

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hac distinctione, quam ponit Magister de hoc praedicato *Deus Pater*, quod potest esse constructio *appositiva* et *immediata*, vel *mediata*.[10] *Primo* enim videtur, quod ista distinctio non sit intelligibilis, quoniam quae ex eadem parte intrasitive construuntur, videntur solum immediate construi. *Item* videtur, quod non solvat, quia recta solutio est, cuius dantem oppositum non contingit solvere;[11] sed ista distinctione remota, adhuc manet sophisma, si loco eius quod est *Deus Pater*, solum ponatur *Pater*: ergo etc.

Doubt III

Likewise is asked concerning this distinction, which Master (Peter) posits concerning this predicate "*God the Father*", because it can be an *appositive* and an *immediate* construction, and/or a *mediate* one.[10] For *first* it seems, that that distinction of his is not intelligible, since those which are intransitively constructed on the same side (of the copula), seem to be construed only immediately. *Likewise* it seems, that he does not solve (the question), since the right solution belongs, to the proposed opposite [dantem oppositum] which he does not happen to solve;[11] but that remote distinction of his, still remains a sophism, if in that place that which is "*God the Father*", there placed only "*the Father*": ergo etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri bona est et secundum artem. Nam sicut vult Priscianus,[12] inter adiectivum et substantivum intelligi- / -tur media copula *ens* vel *quod est ens*.

I respond: It must be said, that Master (Peter)'s distinction is good and according to the art (of grammar). For as Priscian would have it [vult],[12] between the adjective and the substantive there is understo- / -od the intermediate copula '*being'* [ens] and/or *that which is a being*.

---

[1] Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit Vat. hic *ita*.
[2] Supple: se habendi. — De hac distinctione vide infra d. 26. q. 1 et 2.
[3] In mss. et edd. excidit particula *de*, quam contextus requirit.

[1] Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 the Vatican edition here repeats *thus* [ita].
[2] Supply: of being regarded. — On this distinction see below in d. 26, q. 1 [especially at n. 3 and in the Scholium, II, nn. 2 & 3] and 2.

[4] Pro maiore intelligentia et explicatione huius dubii cfr. q. 1. et 2. huius distinctionis. — Quoad praepositionem *de* vide infra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2.
[5] Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.): Omne etenim, quoducmque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum.
[6] Vide Aristot., II. Prior. c. 26. (c. 28.) de Instantia.
[7] Cod. S *dividunt*.
[8] Codd. T aa bb satis bene addunt *non, secundum illud secundum quod est idem*, a quibus cod. A in eo tantum divergit, quod particulam *non* minus bene transponit post *quod est*.
[9] De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 3.
[10] Vat. post *appositiva* omittit *et*, quod tamen cum ed. 1 habent codd., quorum nonnulli deinde indebite omittunt *vel mediata*; codd. V X omittunt *et immediata*, quod tamen propter subnexa melius retinetur, licet, quod ad rem attinet, omitti possit, cum *immediata* hic idem sit cum *appositiva*; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3 ad 4. contructioni *appositivae* opponit *mediatam*. — Distinctio Magistri, de qua hic agitur, respicit istam propositionem: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater*. Si haec verba *Deus Pater* immediate coniuncta intelliguntur, ita quidem ut terminus *Pater*, tanquam determinas alterum terminum *Deus*, sit terminus principalis, tunc propositio est vera. Sensus enim est: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, sed Deus Filius*. Si vero disiunctum intelliguntur, ita ut terminus principalis sit *Deus*, cui deinceps adiungitur, *qui est Pater*, sic erit falsa; sensus siquidem est: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus, et Deus Pater est*.
[11] Modus iste loquendi, qui occurrit etiam infra d. 15. p. II. q. 1. in corp. et d. 44. a. 2. q. unic. in corp., sumtus est ex Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. secundum translationem Booethii: Nam si esset haec solutio, dantem oppositum non possibile esset solvere. Secundum translationem autem ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot.) c. 22. sic habetur: Nam si esset haec solutio, quam afferunt, qui contrarium daret solvere non posset. — Paulo infra cod. X *maneret*, cod. Z *remaneret* loco *manet*.
[12] Libr. XVIII. c. 1. post medium: Subauditur enim participium verbi substantivi *ens*, quod in usu nunc nobis non est, pro quo possumus *qui est* vel *qui fuit* dicere vel subaudire. Similiter, aliis casibus nominativum consequentibus, vel supradictum participium vel quae pro eo accipiuntur subaudire necesse est ad nominativum. — Hac Prisciani regula posita. S. Doctor eam applicat, ulteriore addita distinctione respectu ipsius copulae cum termino adiuncto. Nam appositio, si per participium *ens* sive per relativum (quod est, qui est) cum substantivo coniuncta est, respectu eiusdem potest teneri vel *impliccative*, vel *non implicative* sui *in quadam distantia* (sive relativum ut relativum). Si implicative, tunc est constructio appositiva et immediata, et dictio haec: *Deus, qui est Pater* (Deus i. e. Pater) aequivalet huic: *Deus, qui est ipse Pater*; si non implicative, tunc constructio habetur mediata, et dictio haec: *Deus, qui est Pater* aequivalet huic: *Deus, et ille Deus est Pater*, sive etiam: *Deus, qualis est Pater*.

[3] The particle *from* [de] has been left out of the manuscripts and the editions, thought he context requires it.
[4] For a greater understanding and explanation of this doubt cf. qq. 1 and 2 of this distinction. — In regard to this preposition *from* [de] see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
[5] Aristotle, Metaphysics, text 12 (Bk. IX, ch. 3): For indeed every whatever is a being, either the same or diverse.
[6] See Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 26 (ch. 28) On Instances.
[7] Codex S has the subjunctive *divide* [dividant].
[8] Codices T aa and bb add well enough *not (so), according to that (principle), to the extent that it is the same*, from which codex A diverges in this alone, that it transposes the particle *not* [non], not so well, after *that it is* [quod est].
[9] Concerning this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50. m. 3, a. 2, §. 1; St. Thomas, here in q. 1. a. 3, at n. 3.
[10] The Vatican edition after *appositive* omits *and an* [et], which the codices, however, have together with edition 1, of which not a few then unduly omit *and/or a mediate one* [vel mediata]; codices. V and X omit *and an immediate* [et immediata], which however on account of the subjoined is better retained, though, because it implies this [ad rem attinet], can be omitted, since here the *immediate* is the same with the *appositive*; St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3, at n. 4, opposes the *mediate* to the *appositive* construction. — The distinction of Master (Peter), which is dealt with here, respects that proposition: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater*. If these words *Deus Pater* are understood as immediately conjoined, indeed so that the term *Pater*, as determining the other term *Deus*, is the principle term, then the proposition is true. For the sense is: *He begot the God, who is not God the Father, but rather God the Son*. However, if they are understood disjunctively, so that the principle term is *Deus*, to which there is then added, *who is the Father*, it will thus be false; for the sense is then: *He begot the God, who is not God, and God is the Father*.
[11] That manner of speaking, which occurs also below in d. 15, p. II, q. 1 in the body, and in d. 44, a. 2, q. sole in the body, has been taken from Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi, Bk. II, ch. 3, according to the translation of Boethius: For if this would be the solution, it would not be possible to solve the objection being given. But according to the translation had in the Parisian Edition (Firmin-Didot.), ch. 22, thus: For if this would be the solution, he who would give the contrary cannot solve that, which they bring forward. — A little below this codex X has *would remain* [maneret], codex Z *would remain* [remaneret] in place of *remains* [manet].
[12] Grammer, Bk. XVIII, c. 1, in the second half: For a participle [participium] of the substantive word *being* is understood, which is now not in use among us, in place of which we can say and/or understand *that which is* and/or *that which was*. Similarly, for the other cases following after the nominative, for the nominative it is necessary that there be understood

the above said participle and/or those things which are accepted in its place. — After having posited this rule of Priscian, the Seraphic Doctor applies it, with respect to the further added distinction of that copula together with an adjoined term. For apposition, if it has been conjoined by the participle *being* or by the relative ("which is", "who is") with a substantive, it can, in respect of the same, be held *implicatively* and/or *non implicatively* or *in a certain distance* (or relative as a relative). If implicatively, then there is an appositive and an immediate construction, and this saying: *God, who is the Father* (God, i. e. the Father) is equivalent to this: *the God, who is the Father Himself*; if non implicatively, then it is had as a mediate construction, and this saying: *God, who is the Father* is equivalent to this: *God, and that God is the Father*, or even: *the God, the one which is the Father*.

---

p. 105

intelligi- / -tur media copula *ens* vel *quod est ens*.[1] Et quoniam hoc quod est *ens* sive quod est *Pater* potest teneri *implicative*; et sic restringitur et tenet locum appositivae constructionis et aequivalet uni termino: ideo dicitur, quod potest teneri sive construi *immediate*; et sic *Deus Pater* non est aliud quam ipse et ita in quadam distantia; et tunc non restringitur, et sensus est: *Deus Pater*, id est *Deus*, qui est Pater; quod tantum valet *est Deus*, et ille est Pater.

there is understo- / -od the intermediate copula ‘*being’* [ens] and/or *that which is being*.[1] And since this which is *a being* or which is *the Father* can be held *implicatively*; and in this manner it is restricted and holds the place of an appositive construction and is equivalent to one term: for that reason there is said, that it can be held or construed *immediately*; and thus “*God the Father*” is not other than He Himself and thus in a certain distance; and then it is not restricted, and the sense is: “*God the Father*”, that is “the *God*, who is the Father”; because it means [valet] only “*He is God*”, and “He is the Father”.

Haec autem solutio Magisteri solvit quidem[2] sophisma quantum, ad unam deceptionem, et ideo est bona. Sed rursus cadit ibi alia deceptio de *relativo*, et ideo adhuc oportet solvere, non ad illam deceptionem, sed ad aliam. Ideo Praepositivus[3] solvit ad hoc argumentum alio modo: ergo Deum qui est Pater, vel qui non est Pater, et dicit, quod non sequitur, nec[4] sunt contradictoriae, quia suppositio huius relativi non est eadem. In affirmativa enim supponit pro Deo genito, quia non confunditur;[5] in negativa vero simpliciter. Unde sicut hae non contradicunt, sed ambae sunt falsae: Nullus homo est Petrus, Ioannes est Petrus, ita dicit in proposito, quia negatio confundit. Unde istae dua ambae sunt falsae: Deus Filius est Pater, Deus non est Pater. — Sed

Moreover this solution of Master (Peter) solves a certain[2] sophism as much as regards one deception, and for that reason it is good. But there again falls another deception concerning the *relative*, and for that reason one must [oportet] solve it still, not as regards that deception, but as regards another. For that reason Praepositivus[3] solves it in another manner regarding this argument: ‘therefore that (He is) the God who is the Father’, and/or ‘. . who is not the Father’, and he says, that it does not follow, nor[4] are they contradictories, because the supposition of this relative is not the same. For in an affirmative (proposition) it supposes on behalf of the begotten God, because (in this manner alone the term) is not confounded;[5]

licet solutio Praepositivi locum habeat in proposito, quia non differt praeponere et postponere negationem huic termino *Deus*, tamen in aliis non habet locum. Negatio enim postposita relativo ipsum non confundit.

however in a negative (proposition it supposes) simply. Whence just as these do not contradict, but are both false: 'No man is Peter', 'John is Peter', so he says in the proposed (text), that a negation does confound (the terms). Whence those two are both false: 'God the Son is the Father', 'God is not the Father'. — But though the solution of Praepositivus has a place in the proposition [proposito], because placing a negation before and after this term "*God*" does not differ, nevertheless [tamen] it has no place among other (propositions). For a negation placed after a relative does not confound it.

Et ideo moderni aliter solvunt distinguendo, quod[6] hoc relativum *qui* potest facere relationem *simplicem* vel *personalem*. Si *simplicem*, affirmativa vera est, negativa falsa; si *personalem*, e converso negativa vera, affirmativa falsa. Quod patet, quia haec est falsa: persona Filii est Pater, et haec est vera: « persona Filii non est Pater ».[7]

And for that reason the moderns solve it in another manner by distinguishing, that[6] this relative "*who*" can cause a *simple* and/or a *personal* relation. If a *simple*, the affirmative is true, the negative false; if a *personal*, conversely the negative (is) true, the affirmative false. Which is clear, because this is false: 'the Person of the Son is the Father', and this is true: « the Person of the Son is not the Father ».[7]

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *unus Deus est tres personae*. Sed contra: Quaecumque praedicantur de uno et eodem, praedicantur de se invicem: ergo si unus Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Pater est Filius. *Si tu dicas*, quod verum est, quando praedicantur de uno singulari, sed non est verum, quando praedicantur de uno communi; *contra*: nihil subiicitur duobus in unica[8] suppositione, quamvis sit commune ad illa. Unde haec est falsa: homo est Socrates et Plato: ergo similiter in proposito.

Doubt IV

Likewise there is asked concerning this which he says, that *the one God is the Three Persons*. But on the contrary: Whatever are predicated of one and the same, are predicated of each other: therefore if the one God is the Father and the Son: therefore the Father is the Son. *If you say*, that it is true, when they are predicates of one singular, but it is not true, when they are predicates of one common; *on the contrary*: nothing is subjected to two in a unique[8] supposition, even though it be common to them. Whence this is false: 'a man is Socrates and Plato': therefore similarly in the proposition [proposito].

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut patet, de suppositione huius nominis *Deus* secus est quam de suppositione alicuius alterius termini. Quia enim[9] habet naturam termini communis et discreti, ideo simul stat pro pluribus, sicut pro uno: et ideo non sequitur: Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Deus Pater est Filius, vel e converso.[10] Similiter nec licet inferre ex hoc, quod Pater

I respond: It must be said, that it concerns the supposition of this noun "*God*" differently than (it does) the supposition of any other term. For[9] because it has the nature of a common and a discrete term, for that reason it stands simultaneously for more, as for one: and for that reason there does not follow: "God is the Father and the Son": therefore "God the Father is the

sit Filius. Et notandum, quod talis praedicatio est per identitatem:[11] ideo suppositum de termino formali vere praedicatur.

Son", and/or conversely.[10] Similarly neither is it licit to infer from this, that the Father is the Son. And it must be noted, that such predication is through identity:[11] for that reason a supposit is truly predicated of [de] a formal term.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Magister dicit: *Unum solum Deum verum esse Trinitatem*; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicit inferius,[12] scilicet quod *trinitas* est nomen collectivum, *unus et solus* nomen partitivum et discretivum: ergo sicut haec est falsa: unus solus homo est omnis homo, ita et haec.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen *trinitas* est[13] collectivum personarum; *unus* autem et *solus*, addita huic termino *Deus*, non dicunt discretionem personae, sed naturae ab aliis. Unde unus / solus Deus dicitur una sola natura; . . .

Doubt V

Likewise is asked concerning this which Master (Peter) says: *that the One Only True God is the Trinity*; because it seems to be contrary to that which he says further down,[12] that is, that *trinity* is a collective noun, "*one*" *and* "*only*" [unus et solus] a partitive and separative [discretivum] noun: therefore just as this is false: 'the one only man is every man', so also this.

I respond: It must be said, that this noun "*trinity*" is a collective[13] of the Persons; moreover "*one*" and "*only*", added to this term "*God*", do not mean a separation [discretionem] of a Person, but of the Nature from others. Whence the one / only God is said (to be) the one only Nature.

---

[1] *Ens* videtur hic esse superfluum iuxta verba Prisciani. — Mox ex codd. F T etc. addidimus *Et*. Paulo post nonnulli codd. ut H I P Q cum ed. 1 *et tunc* loco *et sic*.
[2] Substituimus fide multorum codd. ut A F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1 *quidem* loco *quoddam*; lectio certe melior.
[3] Natione Italus, ab an. 1206 Cancellarius Universitatis Patrisiensis, scripsit Summam theologicam ex dictis SS. Patrum, a S. Bonav. et S. Thom. non raro allegatam et adhuc ineditam. De Sermonibus eiudem cfr. Lecoy, La chaire Française au moyen âge p. 80. — Mox Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit *ad*. Paulo post codd. *ergo Deus*, sed minus conforme textui Magistri.
[4] Vat. praeter fiem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *et quod non* pro *nec*. Mox cod. Z *contradictorie opposita* loco *contradictoriae*. Paulo infra post *relativi* supple: qui. — Mox codd. O Z post *eadem* satis bene addunt *in affirmativa et negativa*, supple: propositione.
[5] Hoc est, non supponit confuse et indiscriminatim pro tribus personis, sed determinate solum pro persona Filii; e contra in negativa supponit simipliciter i. e. indiscriminatim et confuse pro personis et etiam pro essentia. Cfr. hic q. 4. Hinc patet, quid sibi velit paulo infra *negatio confundit* (codd. *confunditur*), scil. negatio efficit, ut relativum *qui* supponere possit tam pro tribus personis quam pro essentia.
[6] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus apte transponit *quod* post relativum *qui*. Paulo post plures codd. *distinctionem* pro *relationem*; ed. 1 vero *distinctionem vel relationem*. Retinuimus *relationem*, utpote quod supra dicits q. 1. in corp.

[1] *Being* [ens] here seems to be superfluous in accord with the words of Priscian. — Then from codices F T etc. we have added *And* [et]. A little after this not a few codices as H I P Q together with edition 1 have *and then* [et tunc] in place of *and in this manner* [et sic].
[2] Trusting in many codices as A F G H I R S T etc. and edition 1 we have substituted the masculine *a certain* [quidem] in place of the neuter *a certain* [quoddam]; a reading certainly better.
[3] Italian by nation, Chancellor of the University of Paris from the year 1206, he wrote A Theological Summa of the sayings of the Holy Fathers, not rarely quoted by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and as yet unedited. On the Sermons of the same, cf. Lecoy, La chaire Française au moyen âge, p. 80. — Then the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits *for* [ad]. A little after this the codices have *therefore God* [ergo Deus], but this is less conformable to the text of Master (Peter).
[4] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 has *and that they are not* [et quod non sunt] in place of *and they are not* [nec sunt]. Then codex Z has *have they been opposed in a contradictory manner* [sunt contradictorie opposita] in place of *are they contradictories* [sunt contradictoriae]. A little below this after *relative* supply: "who" [qui]. — Then codices O and Z after *the same* [eadem] add, well enough, *in an affirmative and negative*, supply: proposition.
[5] That is, it does not substitute in a confused manner nor indiscriminately for the Three Persons, but determinately only for the person of the Son; and contrarily in a negative (proposition) it substitutes

magis correspondet. Ibidem et divisio relationis in *simplicem* et *personalem* occurit.
[7] De solutione huius dubii vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad. 4. et S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 5. — Biel, hic q. 1.
[8] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *una*.
[9] Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *cum* pro *enim*.
[10] Codd. inter se non conveniunt; cod. T quoad sensum cum Vat. convenit ponendo *vel Filius est Pater* loco *e converso*. Plures codd. ut A G N S V W aa bb *ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est Pater vel Filius. Similiter*; alii ut C O *ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est. Similiter*; alii aliter corrupte; sed nihil immutandum duximus.
[11] De praedicatione per *identitatem* vide infra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; d. 33. q. 3. et d. 34. q. 2. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4. et Scot., hic q. 2.
[12] Dist. XXII. c. 3. et dd. XXIV, et XXV.
[13] Cod. T addit *nomen*.

simply, i. e. indiscriminately and in a confused manner for the Persons and also for the Essence. Cf. here q. 4. Hence it is clear, what he wants a little below *a negation does confound (the terms)* (the codices have *is confounded*), that is, a negation causes [efficit ut] the relative *who* to be able to substitute as much for the Three Persons as for the Essence.
[6] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, less aptly has *this relative "who" which*) [hoc relativum *qui* quod]. A little after this very many codices have *distinction* in place of *relation*; however edition 1 has *distinction and/or relation* [distinctionem vel relationem]. We have retained *relation* [relationem], as it corresponds more with what is said above in q. 1 in the body (of the question). In the same place the division of the relation into *the simple* and *the personal* also occurs.
[7] Concerning the solution of this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summma., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 4. St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3, at n. 4, and Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4, at n. 5. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.
[8] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has *one* [una].
[9] The Vatican edition, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, has *When* [cum] in place of *For* [enim].
[10] The codices do not agree among themselves; codex T in regard to the sense agrees with the Vatican edition by putting *and/or the Son is the Father* in place of *conversely* [e converso]. Very many codices as A G N S V W aa bb have *therefore God the Father and/or the Son is the Father and/or the Son. Similarly*; others as C and O have *therefore He is God the Father and/or He is the Son. Similarly*; the others are otherwise corrupt; but we judge nothing to be changed.
[11] Concerning predication by *identity* see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2; d. 33, q. 3 and d. 34, q. 2. — Concerning this doubt cf. above q. 4 and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2.
[12] Distinction XXII, ch. 3 and dd. XXIV and XXV.
[13] Codex T adds *name* [nomen].

Unde unus / solus Deus dicitur una sola natura; et quoniam in divinis est idem *natura* et *res naturae* sive suppositum, ideo praedicatione per identitatem *Trinitas* de Deo[1] praedicatur. Nec est simile de hoc quod est *omnis homo* et *unus solus homo*. Nam iste terminus *homo* est terminus, qui potest confundi et multiplicari, et ideo haec est vera: omnis homo est homo, nec stat simul pro pluribus,[2] nisi confundatur; et ideo haec est falsa: homo est omnis homo, quia nec ratione supponendi est vera, nec per

Whence the One / Only God is said (to be) the one only Nature; and since among the divine the same is *nature* and the *thing of the Nature* or the Supposit, for that reason by an identity in predication "*the Trinity*" is predicated of God.[1] Nor is it similar from this that *every man* is also *one man only*. For that term "*man*" is a term, which can be confounded and multiplied, and for that reason this is true: "every man is a man", nor does it stand simultaneously for more (men),[2] unless it be confounded; and for

identitatem, nec est idem in homine *natura* et *res naturae*.[3]

that reason this is false: "man is every man", because (this proposition) is neither true according to (its) reckoning of supposing, nor by an identity (in predication), nor is *nature* and the *thing of the nature* the same in man.[3]

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Satis est christiano rerum creatarum causam* etc. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quoniam aut dicit *satis* quantum ad *fidem*; et sic est falsum, quia multa alia oportet credere; aut *satis* quantum ad *scientiam*; et illud similiter est falsum, quia nunquam scitur ex hoc causa rei sufficienter.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod intelligitur *satis* quantum ad scientiam, non quamlibet, sed necessariam ad salutem.

DOUBT VI

Likewise is asked of this which he says: *It is enough for the Christian . . . the cause of created things* etc.. For it seems that he says (something) false, since either he says "*enough*" [satis] as much as regards *faith*; and thus it is false, because it is proper to believe many other (things); or "*enough*" according to *science*; and that similarly is false, because nothing is known sufficiently from this cause of a thing.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that "*enough*" is understood as much as regards knowledge [scientia], not any (kind), but (that which is) necessary for salvation.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Pater genuit alterum se*. Videtur enim male coniungere illa duo, quia se dicit omnimodam identitatem, et *alterum* diversitatem, et ita sunt opposita, et ita[4] opposita implicantur. *Si dicas*, quod unum diminuit de altero, quaero: *quid* et *de quo?*

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod oppositio directa intelligitur semper circa idem. Quoniam ergo in divinis simul est identitas in natura et alietas in supposito, et hoc sine oppositione; ideo nomen *identitatis* et *alietatis* in sermone[5] uniuntur sine oppositione, immo ad singularis modi expressionem.

DOUBT VII

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *the Father begot the other-Himself* [alterum se]. For it seems that those two are badly conjoined, because "himself" [se] means every manner of identity, and "*the other*" [alterum] a diversity, and thus they are opposites, and thus[4] they imply opposites. *If you say*, that he diminished one from the other, I ask: *what* (is diminished) and *from what* (is it diminished)?

I RESPOND: It must be said, that direct opposition is always understood about the same (thing). Therefore since among the divine there is simultaneously identity in Nature and otherness in Supposit, and this without opposition; for that reason the name for *identity* and for *otherness* in discourse [sermone] are united[5] without opposition, nay rather for the expression of the singular manner (of Being).

DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Pater ut haberet Filium, non minuit se*, quia videtur dicere falsum; quia illud argumentum valet:

DOUBT VIII

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *The Father to have a Son, did not lessen Himself*, because it seems that he

quicumque generat unum filium, ut non possit amplius generare, minuitur eius potentia; sed sic est in Patre: ergo etc.

says (something) false; because that argument means [valet]: 'whoever generates one son, so that he is not able to generate more, is lessened in his potency'; but so it is in the Father: ergo etc..

R**ESPONDEO**: Quod illud verum est, si generare alterum sit potentiae; sed quod, uno genito, possit alterum generare, dicit imperfectionem potentiae in generando, quia ex hoc ostenditur, quod non totum dedit uni.[6]

I **RESPOND**: That that is true, if 'to generate the other' belongs to potency; but that, 'one having begotten one, can generate the other', means an imperfection of power in generating, because from this there is shown, that he has not given (his) whole (being) to one.

DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *De se alterum se genuit, sed non alterum deum, sed alteram personam*, utrum dicatur magis proprie *alterum*, vel *alium*; et[7] videtur quod *alterum*, quia minorem dicit diversitatem, quia Socrates dicitur alter a se; sed in divinis minima est diversitas. *Sed contra*: differentiae accidentales faciunt dici *alterum*;[8] sed in divinis nullum est accidens: ergo non debet dici *alterum*.

Item videtur, quod neutrum bene dicatur. Si enim differentiae substantiales faciunt dici *aliud*, et accidentales *alterum*, cum neutrum cadat in divinis, neutrum videtur esse dicendum.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod quia Pater differt a Filio et in supposito et in proprietate, ideo potest dici *alius*, et potest dici *alter*. Sed quoniam proprietas illa non accidit personae, ideo magis proprie dicitur *alius*. Et quia *alius* respicit suppositum, *aliud* essentiam: ideo, etsi recipiatur[9] ibi *alius* in masculino, non tamen *aliud* in neutro.

DOUBT IX

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *From Himself He begot the other (than) Himself, but not the other God, but (rather) the other Person*, whether one says more properly "*the other*" [alterum], and/or "*an other*" [alium]; and[7] it seems that "*the other*" (is more proper), because it means less diversity, because "Socrates" means 'the other than [a] himself'; but among the divine there is the least diversity. *But on the contrary*: accidental differences cause "*the other*" to be said;[8] but among the divine there is no accident: therefore there ought not be said "*the other*".

Likewise it seems, that neither is said well. For if substantial differences cause "*an other (thing)*" [aliud] to be said, and accidental ones "*the other (one)*" [alterum], since neither occurs [cadat] among the divine, it seems that neither is to be said.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that because the Father differs from the Son both in supposit and in property, for that reason there can be said "*an other (one)*" [alius], and there can be said "*the other (one)*" [alter]. But since that property does not accede to the Person, for that reason there is more properly said "*an other (one)*" [alius]. And because "*an other (one)*" respects a supposit, "*an other (thing)*" [aliud] an essence: for that reason, even if there were received[9] there "*an other (one)*" in the masculine, nevertheless [tamen] (there ought not be) "*an other (thing)*" in the neuter.

---

[1] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 *eo* pro *Deus*.

[2] Cod. W *omnibus*. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut F H T Y cc cum edd. 2, 3 *suppositi* loco *supponendi*.

[3] De re naturae sive supposito vide infra d. 23. a. 1.

---

[1] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 has *Him* [eo] in place of *Deo* [God].

[2] Codex W has *all* [omnibus]. A little below this not a

q. 2. et d. 34. q. 1. — Quoad ipsam solutionem cfr. infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 6.

[4] Vat. contra fere omnes mss. et ed. 1 *illa* pro *ita*, quod unus vel aliter codex omittit.

[5] Fide mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic additum *uno* et paulo post ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *immo*, loco cuius edd. 2, 3 *in uno* . — De hoc dubio cfr. hic q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 4.

[6] Cfr. supra d. 2. q. 3. ad ult.

[7] Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.

[8] Cfr. Porphyr. de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.

[9] Licet plurimi codd. et ed. 1 habeant *si*, praeferimus tamen cum codd. L R etc. *etsi*. Codd. cit. et ed. 1 deinde legunt *recipiatur* (multi codd. falso *respiciatur*) pro *recipitur*. De solutione huius dubii cfr. hic q. 2. et infra d. 9. dub. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 2. ad ult. et a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 31. a. 2. ac S. III. q. 17. a. 1 ad 7, ubi de differentia inter *alium* et *alterum* eadem sententia profertur.

few codices as F H T Y cc together with editions 2 and 3 have *reckoning of the supposit* [ratione suppositi] in place of *reckoning of supposing* [ratione supponendi].

[3] Concerning the "thing of nature" [res naturae] or the supposit, see below d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 34, q. 1. — In regard to this solution cf below d. 24, a. 3, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 7. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 39, a. 6.

[4] The Vatican edition contrary to nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 has *those opposites* [illa opposita] in place of *thus . . . opposites* [ita opposita], which one and/or the other codices omit.

[5] Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, 2, and 3 we have expunged the here added *in one (term)* [uno] and a little after this from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *nay rather* [immo], in place of which editions 2 and 3 have *in one (term)* [in uno]. — On this doubt cf. here in q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 3. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4, at n. 4.

[6] Cf. above d. 2, q. 3, at the last n..

[7] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the particle *and* [et].

[8] Cf. Porphyry, On Predicables, ch. "On Difference".

[9] Though very many codices and edition 1 have *if* [si], we prefer, however, the reading of codices L R etc. *even if* [etsi]. The codices cited and edition 1 then read *there were received* [recipiatur] (many codices falsely have *were respected* [respiciatur]) in place of (sic) *there is received* [recipitur]. Concerning the solution of this doubt cf. here q. 2, and below d. 9, doubt 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 2, at the last n., and a. 4. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 31, a. 2, and III, q. 17, a. 1, at n. 7, where concerning the difference between *an other (thing)* [alium] and *the other (one)* [alterum] the same opinion is proffered.
